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THE NEED FOR NON-DISCRETIONARY 
INTERLOCUTORY APPELLATE REVIEW IN 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 
Andrew S. Pollis*
 
 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) is a tool for managing complex litigation 
by transferring cases with common questions of fact to a single judge for 
coordinated pretrial proceedings.  The subject matter of the cases can run 
the gamut from airplane crashes to securities fraud to environmental 
disasters, such as the recent BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  Today, 
about a third of all pending civil cases in federal court are part of the MDL 
system.  A single judge renders all the important legal decisions in each 
MDL, exerting outsized impact on the parties and on the evolution of the 
law—and does so with virtually no scrutiny from other judges.  This power 
centralization promotes efficient case management, but it can be an 
anathema to our conception of decentralized justice.  One instance of 
unreviewable pretrial error can have immediate and sweeping impact on 
thousands of cases in one fell swoop. 
It is time to restore the balance of judicial power.  This Article argues for 
an expansion of non-discretionary interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over 
certain legal rulings rendered in MDL cases. 
Any opportunity to appeal before the end of the case reflects an inherent 
value judgment that the immediate rights at stake outweigh the burdens that 
interlocutory review imposes on the courts.  The discretionary approach to 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction has proven generally adequate.  But it is 
not adequate in the context of MDL proceedings, where the risks and 
consequences of legal error are heightened considerably.  Ultimately, MDL 
cases tend to settle rather than proceed to final judgment, so the appellate 
courts rarely have an opportunity to clarify the law, and the settlements are 
often mispriced as a result of the uncertainty.  The absence of appellate 
review also deprives our jurisprudence of one of its central features—the 
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back-and-forth negotiation of legal principles that occurs when multiple 
jurists grapple with the same legal questions. 
Certain interlocutory MDL orders, then, warrant mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction.  To qualify, the order should involve a pure issue of law in an 
unsettled area or in contravention of established precedent, and immediate 
appellate review should potentially be dispositive of a significant number of 
cases in the MDL.  The guaranteed availability of immediate review in 
these circumstances would not come without costs, but the benefits would 
far outweigh them.  Indeed, the right of immediate appeal would ensure the 
integrity of the MDL process on which our legal system has come so heavily 
to depend. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Excessive power, whether in the hands of an evil dictator or a benevolent 
judge, should make us nervous.  Our nervousness should grow in proportion 
to the number of persons subject to that power.  It should also grow when 
there is no meaningful check on that power. 
The federal statute authorizing multidistrict litigation (MDL) effectively 
vests that sort of outsized, unreviewable power in federal district judges.  
The MDL system creates the sort of “kingly power” in trial judges that the 
U.S. Congress has historically found repugnant1—the sort of power that 
Congress has taken steps to “overthrow” by expanding appellate 
jurisdiction.2
Modern litigation has demanded creative case-aggregation and judicial-
management tools.  The MDL is one of those tools.  Propelled in large 
measure by the rise of the mass tort, the MDL system aggregates separately 
filed federal actions that involve “one or more common questions of fact.”
  But there is no appellate jurisdiction over most interlocutory 
MDL orders.  And that should make us nervous. 
3  
The actions, wherever filed, are transferred to a single judge who holds the 
power to make every pretrial ruling in all of them.4
 
 1. See 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (statement of Rep. David Culberson) (legislative 
history of Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891)). 
  The actions 
 2. See id. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). 
 4. E.g., Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem:  Unconstitutional Class Actions and 
Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 881 (2005); see also Douglas 
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consolidated in an MDL proceeding can number in the thousands.5  A 
single judge, for example, will handle hundreds of federal actions arising 
out of the 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.6
Consolidation of power in a single federal judge offers advantages in 
terms of uniformity, efficiency, and the facilitation of global settlement.
 
7  
But it also ratchets up considerably the risk and consequences of legal error, 
particularly when the MDL raises issues of first impression.  A single 
judge’s thinking exerts a disproportionate influence on the evolution of the 
law.8  New legal theories emerge, unrefined by the scrutiny of other trial-
court judges wrestling with the same problems.  And, because interlocutory 
rulings generally are not subject to immediate appeal, the trial judge 
presiding over an MDL lacks any meaningful appellate supervision.9  For 
the sake of gaining control over case management, the existing MDL 
format sacrifices a critical component of law management.  The power 
consolidation also leaves litigants, unable to take an immediate appeal, with 
a Hobson’s choice:  (a) risk a highly unfavorable trial verdict that may 
result from the judge’s mistaken view of the law, with the hope of securing 
relief on a post-trial appeal; or (b) avoid the risk by settling before trial—
but at a price that reflects the erroneous legal rulings.10
It is unclear whether Congress lacked the foresight to anticipate these 
problems when it passed the Multidistrict Litigation Act
 
11
 
McCollam, Slick on Slick, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 7, 2010, at 44, 62 (noting that a 
multidistrict litigation (MDL) judge “customarily exercises a lot of sway”). 
 in 1968 or 
whether it consciously determined that the anticipated benefits of so 
structuring the MDL system outweighed these costs.  Either way, it failed to 
appreciate the value of building into the MDL process a right, under limited 
circumstances, to appeal immediately from significant pretrial rulings in 
MDLs.  Early appellate scrutiny would serve as a much-needed antidote to 
the excess power the current MDL system bestows on the individual 
presiding judge.  And it would replace the Hobson’s choice with an 
opportunity for real, systematic dispensation of justice while leaving the 
parties free to settle without appeal if that is their preference. 
 5. See, e.g., In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing MDL involving 
“14,000 actions filed by some 30,000 to 35,000 plaintiffs”). 
 6. See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 83268 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010); see also In re BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL 
No. 2185, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83263, at *4 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010) (consolidating 
under single judge all federal actions involving allegations that BP misled investors about its 
safety measures). 
 7. Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class 
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2223 (2008); see also Danielle Oakley, Note, 
Is Multidistrict Litigation a Just and Efficient Consolidation Technique?  Using Diet Drug 
Litigation As a Model To Answer This Question, 6 NEV. L.J. 494, 506 (2005). 
 8. See Moller, supra note 4, at 857. 
 9. Cf. Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure:  
Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527, 530 (2002). 
 10. E.g., Michael J. Davidson, A Modest Proposal:  Permit Interlocutory Appeals of 
Summary Judgment Denials, 147 MIL. L. REV. 145, 205 (1995). 
 11. See Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
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As I explain in Part I, the hodgepodge avenues of interlocutory appellate 
jurisdiction fall into two basic categories:  mandatory jurisdiction and 
discretionary jurisdiction.  Every right of interlocutory appeal reflects a 
value judgment that the immediate vindication of a particular right justifies 
early involvement of an appellate court, at the expense of judicial economy 
and trial-court autonomy.  The difference between mandatory and 
discretionary jurisdiction is in essence one of allocating the task of making 
that value judgment.  Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
sometimes made the judgments categorically, establishing mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction over certain kinds of interlocutory orders that always 
have a “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.”12  But in large measure 
the opportunity for interlocutory review is left to the lower courts to provide 
or to decline, based on subjective case-by-case determinations.  We can 
frame the distinction as one of rules (mandatory jurisdiction) versus 
standards (discretionary jurisdiction)13 or as another example of the debate 
over institutional choice (“deciding who decides”).14  However scrutinized, 
the end result is that our current system vests trial and appellate courts with 
broad and misplaced discretion to deny interlocutory review over important 
orders in MDLs.  The existing scholarship has not offered an adequate 
solution; commentators have frequently criticized rules of appellate 
jurisdiction15 and have advocated for expanding the scope of discretionary 
interlocutory review.16  But tinkering with discretionary review is 
inadequate in the MDL context.  Litigants in MDLs should enjoy a right of 
interlocutory appellate review when the trial court steps outside the 
parameters of settled law and when the decision in question has widespread 
impact on MDL litigants.17
Part II shows how the absence of guaranteed appellate review over MDL 
cases has increasingly significant consequences.  The proportion of suits 
 
 
 12. Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). 
 13. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE 
L.J. 557, 559–60 (1992) (“[A] rule may entail an advance determination of what conduct is 
permissible, leaving only factual issues for the adjudicator . . . .  A standard may entail 
leaving both specification of what conduct is permissible and factual issues for the 
adjudicator.”); see also Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. 
REV. (forthcoming Mar. 2011) (manuscript at 17–25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1673116 (discussing distinction between rules and standards and analogizing it to distinction 
between mandates and discretion). 
 14. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1994). 
 15. Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1294 
(2007); see also Thomas E. Baker, An Annotated Bibliography on Federal Appellate 
Practice and Procedure, 10 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 13 (2009) (listing numerous articles on 
appellate jurisdiction and related issues). 
 16. See infra notes 101–13 and accompanying text. 
 17. Only one prior commentator, Professor Timothy P. Glynn, has advocated the 
expansion of mandatory appellate jurisdiction over trial court decisions in what he 
characterizes as “problem areas.” Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion:  
Discretionary Review of Interlocutory Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 259 (2001).  
But Professor Glynn makes no mention of the MDL system and declines to identify any 
specific problem areas to which his analysis would apply. Id. at 261–62; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 115–22. 
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consolidated in MDLs has grown considerably since Congress first 
authorized MDLs in 1968.  In recent years, up to one-third of all civil 
lawsuits pending in the federal courts have been consolidated in MDLs.  A 
single trial-court decision can implicate hundreds, or even thousands, of 
individual lawsuits.  As a result, MDL decisions can have an exaggerated 
influence both for the parties to MDL proceedings and for the evolution of 
the law.  The existing rules of appellate jurisdiction rarely permit immediate 
appellate review of most significant MDL decisions; the decisions in 
question do not fit the traditional mold of orders reviewable as of right, and 
discretionary review in this context is unreliable.  To illustrate the 
untenability of the status quo, I look closely at some of the more 
controversial decisions rendered in a high-profile product-liability MDL 
involving a gasoline additive—decisions that, to date, have evaded 
appellate review.18
Building on my analysis in Parts I and II, I propose in Part III a right of 
immediate appellate review in MDLs from interlocutory orders that raise 
important issues of unsettled law (or departures from settled law) and that 
are potentially dispositive of a significant number of the consolidated cases.  
My proposed test would essentially convert an existing discretionary right 
of appeal in the ordinary case into a mandatory right of appeal if the case is 
part of an MDL proceeding.  The reform would provide a much-needed and 
meaningful check on MDL judges.  It also would create a foundation for 
global settlement based not on the coercion of a single trial judge’s 
potentially erroneous view of the law, but instead on carefully considered 
legal principles that have been forged in the course of full-scale appellate 
review.  While the greater access to appellate review would not come 
without costs, the benefits for the litigants, for both the evolution of the law 
and the public’s confidence in the judicial system would far outweigh them. 
 
I.  MANDATORY AND DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION:  
DELINEATING WHO MAKES THE VALUE JUDGMENTS 
A.  Access to the Appellate Courts As an Expression of Value Judgments 
The right to appeal in American jurisprudence is “sacrosanct,” and “we 
clutch it reverently to our collective breast.”19  In federal civil cases, the 
right, born with the Judiciary Act of 1789,20 is credited with enhancing the 
federal courts’ “ability to administer justice in a regular, evenhanded, and 
confidence-inspiring manner.”21
 
 18. In the interest of full disclosure, I also note that I served as counsel for one of the 
principal defendants in the referenced MDL and attempted, unsuccessfully, to obtain 
interlocutory appellate review of some of the decisions I describe below. 
  That public confidence results from a 
 19. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right To Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE 
L.J. 62, 62, 64 (1985).  Professor Dalton questions the desirability of appeals of right 
generally and proposes that they be limited to certain categories of cases. See id. at 97–107. 
 20. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84. 
 21. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm:  Reflections on 
Histories of Lower Federal Courts, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 712 (1999). 
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blend of what Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson identifies as “three of 
the basic goals of appellate review—(1) increasing the probability of a 
correct judgment; (2) providing uniformity of result; and (3) increasing 
litigants’ sense that their dispute has been fully and fairly heard.”22
But the right is not, and cannot be, unrestricted.  The opportunity for 
appellate review cannot be so broad that it imposes “unmanageable burdens 
on the judicial system” by permitting unlimited rights to appeal 
interlocutory orders.
 
23  Interlocutory appeals burden the appellate courts 
and slow down the resolution of cases in the trial courts.24  The extreme 
example proves the point:  “If parties could take up on appeal each disputed 
ruling by a lower court as it was handed down, the case could drag on 
indefinitely.”25
Thus, every decision to allow an interlocutory appeal necessarily reflects 
a subjective value judgment that the interests of the aggrieved party in the 
prompt resolution of a particular claim of error outweigh the systemic 
interests that militate in favor of requiring that party to wait until the end of 
the case to seek appellate vindication.  By definition, then, permitting 
interlocutory appellate review involves a balancing test of competing policy 
choices.
 
26  The struggle to strike the proper balance is evident in the 
application of the most fundamental rule of appellate jurisdiction, the final-
judgment rule.  Codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291,27 the final-judgment rule 
supposedly restricts appellate jurisdiction to “final” decisions that “end[] 
the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court to do but 
execute the judgment.”28  But finality itself is in the eyes of the beholder; 
Justice Hugo Black observed that the Court’s decisions “dealing with the 
meaning of finality have provided no satisfactory definition of this term.”29
 
 22. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in Federal 
Court:  A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L REV. 733, 771 
(2006); see also Dalton, supra note 
  
19, at 69 (“[A]ppellate courts exist to correct errors; to 
develop legal principles; and to tie geographically dispersed lower courts into a unified, 
authoritative legal system.”). 
 23. Robertson, supra note 22, at 771. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 738. 
 25. Martin H. Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability in the Federal Courts, 
75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89 (1975); see also Glynn, supra note 17, at 222 (appellate review 
normally “should wait until the end of the litigation in the district court”). 
 26. Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and Appealability by Court Rule:  Right 
Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 717, 767 (1993) (“[A]n appeal [should] be 
permitted from an admittedly interlocutory order, when the dangers of allowing an 
interlocutory appeal are outweighed by the advantages of allowing the appeal.”). 
 27. The statute provides, in pertinent part:  “The courts of appeals . . . shall have 
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 28. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945). 
 29. Rederi A/B Disa v. Cunard S.S. Co., 389 U.S. 852, 854 (1967) (Black, J., 
dissenting), denying cert. to 376 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1967); see also McGourkey v. Toledo & 
Ohio Cent. Ry. Co., 146 U.S. 536, 544–45 (1892) (“Probably no question of equity practice 
has been the subject of more frequent discussion in this court than the finality of decrees.”); 
Maurice Rosenberg, Solving the Federal Finality-Appealability Problem, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 1984, at 170, 171 (“The idea that an appeal to the second level of a court 
system should wait until a final decision has issued at the first level of the system is as sweet 
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The Court has also noted that “[n]o verbal formula yet devised can explain 
prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide an utterly reliable 
guide for the future.”30  The guiding principle has nevertheless remained 
the same:  to balance “the most important competing considerations,” which 
“are ‘the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and 
the danger of denying justice by delay on the other.’”31
Grappling with these competing considerations, Congress and the Court 
have frequently “hedged the finality requirement with exceptions and 
qualifications necessitated by shared perceptions that there are times when 
forthright application of a simple rule against piecemeal appeals works 
injustice and diseconomy.”
 
32  We recognize that an opportunity to appeal 
from a nonfinal order sometimes “would prevent irreparable harm to a 
party, advance the termination of the litigation, or serve some broader 
public interest, [so] there have been constant efforts to make exceptions to 
the finality requirement to allow early appeals in some cases.”33
But every argument for expanding appellate rights is met with forceful 
opposition by those keen to limit the exceptions, on the theory that 
permitting “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals . . . undermines ‘efficient 
judicial administration’ and encroaches upon the prerogatives of district 
court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing ongoing litigation.”
 
34  
Several Supreme Court Justices have thus expressed hostility toward the 
expansion of appellate rights; Justice Breyer has “cautioned against 
expanding the class of orders eligible for interlocutory appeal.”35  Justice 
Scalia has observed that “finality jurisprudence is sorely in need of further 
limiting principles.”36
 
and simple as a baby’s kiss.  But as so often happens with legal affairs that are simple in 
theory the finality requirement in actual operation becomes ‘dazzling in its 
complexity’ . . . .” (quoting Edward H. Cooper, Timing As Jurisdiction:  Federal Civil 
Appeals in Context, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 156, 156)). 
  And the Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
 30. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). 
 31. Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152–53 (1964) (quoting Dickinson v. 
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950)); see also Eisen, 417 U.S. at 171.  
Perhaps the Court’s most vexing application of the final-judgment rule is the collateral-order 
doctrine. See infra notes 44–50 and accompanying text. 
 32. Paul D. Carrington, Toward a Federal Civil Interlocutory Appeals Act, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1984, at 165, 165; see also Redish, supra note 25, at 90 (“[T]he 
final judgment rule and its preexisting exceptions have not always been sufficient to assure 
fairness to appellants.”). 
 33. Martineau, supra note 26, at 788; see also Pierre H. Bergeron, District Courts As 
Gatekeepers?  A New Vision of Appellate Jurisdiction over Orders Compelling Arbitration, 
51 EMORY L.J. 1365, 1369 (2002) (“[I]nterlocutory review is largely unavailable in a 
significant number of cases in which it should be appropriate.”); Robertson, supra note 22, at 
741 (“[T]he detriments [of the final-judgment rule] generally outweigh the benefits.”); 
Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1990) (“[I]nterlocutory appeals can and should play a greater 
role in the adjudicative process in the federal courts.”). 
 34. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (quoting Firestone 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)). 
 35. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 320 (1996) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 36. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 292 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
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exceptions to the final-judgment rule are confined to those situations in 
which strict adherence to it “‘would practically defeat the right to any 
review at all.’”37
The back-and-forth debate has given rise to a vast body of literature, 
populated by both courts and commentators, striving “to determine how to 
strike the balance”
 
38 between “allowing meaningful interlocutory review 
when necessary” and avoiding “overburdening the federal appellate system 
with a cascade of interlocutory appeals.”39  The debate is not new; more 
than sixty years ago, the Supreme Court noted that “the volume of judicial 
writing” on the subject was “formidable.”40  And the struggle to construe 
and apply doctrines of appellate jurisdiction continues right up to the 
present day.41
Certainly, then, there is a fundamental question over where to draw the 
line.  Congress, courts, and commentators have all struggled to strike the 
proper balance in conferring adequate opportunities to appeal without 
overburdening the judicial system or inhibiting the expeditious progression 
of cases through the trial courts.  But there is just as fundamental a question 
about who should draw the line.  And, as I explain below in Part I.B, 
Congress and the Supreme Court have ultimately answered that question in 
two different ways.  The first way, expressed in routes of interlocutory 
appeal of right, reflects Congress’s or the Court’s own determination that a 
particular category of trial-court orders always justifies immediate review 
and therefore warrants a fixed rule.  The second way, discretionary 
interlocutory appeal, reflects a decision to delegate to the lower courts the 
task, on a case-by-case basis, of making the value judgments and 
conducting the balancing tests according to flexible standards. 
 
The dual system has spawned a labyrinthian conglomeration of 
jurisdictional rules—a “crazy quilt,” as one student commentator has 
described it42
 
 37. Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part) (quoting Cobbledick v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940)). 
—and commentators frequently criticize the resulting 
confusion.  Confusion aside, I show below in Part I.C that the 
commentators who have advocated expanding appellate jurisdiction have 
 38. See Redish, supra note 25, at 100. 
 39. Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1367; see also Glynn, supra note 17, at 176 (“The 
vexing question is how to distinguish those interlocutory orders that are worthy of immediate 
review from those that are not.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 767 (“[T]he interests of the 
parties in a speedy, fair, just, and effective review of their cases should be weighed against 
the interest in preventing piecemeal appeals.”); Redish, supra note 25, at 100 (“The difficult 
issue is, of course, to determine how to strike the balance in each case.”). 
 40. Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 508 (1950); see also id. at 
516–17 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Finality and appealability have provided judges, lawyers, 
and commentators with a perpetual subject for debate.”). 
 41. See Ortiz v. Jordan, No. 09-737, 2011 U.S. LEXIS 915, at *7 (Jan. 24, 2011) (recent 
decision holding that a party may not “appeal an order denying summary judgment after a 
full trial on the merits”). 
 42. John C. Nagel, Note, Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals 
Jurisprudence with Discretionary Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200, 200 (1994); see also Steinman, 
supra note 15, at 1238–39 (collecting numerous pejorative phrases commentators have used 
to describe the intricacies of federal appellate jurisdiction). 
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focused largely on the discretionary, case-by-case route, rather than 
recognizing a need for categorically expanding rights of mandatory review 
in appropriate circumstances. 
B.  The Existing Avenues of Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction—
Mandatory and Discretionary 
1.  Mandatory Interlocutory Appellate Jurisdiction, Whereby the Supreme 
Court or Congress Has Made Categorical Value Judgments 
The Supreme Court and Congress have sometimes carved out exceptions 
to the final-judgment rule by providing mandatory appellate jurisdiction 
over certain types of interlocutory orders.  In these circumstances, the Court 
or Congress itself has made the value judgment categorically, leaving no 
discretion to the lower courts to decline appellate jurisdiction if a trial 
court’s order fits within particular parameters. 
The Court’s primary contribution was the 1949 creation of the collateral-
order doctrine,43 which permits appeals from orders that “are ‘collateral to’ 
the merits of an action and ‘too important’ to be denied immediate 
review.”44  The Court has actually avoided characterizing the collateral-
order doctrine as a route of interlocutory appeal and instead has emphasized 
that the orders in question are deemed “final,”45 but a collateral order does 
not actually end the action, as a final order normally does.  As a result, the 
collateral-order rule has spawned criticism from both within the Court46 and 
from commentators.47
To illustrate:  the Court has held that an order denying a defendant’s 
motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity meets the collateral-order test, 
because immunity “is both a defense to liability and a limited ‘entitlement 
  For present purposes, the important features of the 
collateral-order doctrine are the value judgments inherently reflected in its 
contours. 
 
 43. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 
 44. E.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 603 (2009) (quoting Cohen, 
337 U.S. at 546). 
 45. See, e.g., Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (collateral-order doctrine is 
“‘best understood not as an exception to the “final decision” rule laid down by Congress in 
[28 U.S.C.] § 1291, but as a “practical construction” of it’” (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. 
Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994))). 
 46. Justice Thomas, concurring in the 2009 decision that rejected application of the 
collateral-order doctrine to orders compelling the production of privileged information, 
suggested that mere consideration of the collateral-order doctrine in such circumstances 
“perpetuates a judicial policy that we for many years have criticized and struggled to limit.” 
Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 610 (Thomas, J., concurring in part).  Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices Thomas and O’Connor, chastised the Court for having “invented” the collateral-
order doctrine, for which “[t]he statutory text [of 28 U.S.C. § 1291] provides no basis.” Sell 
v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 189 n.4 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 47. See, e.g., H. Joon Chung, Comment, Collateral Order—Knee-Deep in Confusion:  
Its Continuing Saga—Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003), 9 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & 
APP. ADVOC. 153, 156 (2004) (“[T]he Court’s application of the collateral order doctrine has 
a checkered history, replete with inconsistency and confusion.”); Steinman, supra note 15, at 
1247–57 (describing and critiquing the collateral order doctrine). 
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not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’”48  Arguably, any 
defendant with a strong defense has an interest in avoiding the burdens of 
litigation.49  But only when the right derives from an immunity does the 
Supreme Court consider the right not to stand trial important enough to 
protect before the fact.50  “[I]t is not mere avoidance of a trial, but 
avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest, that 
counts when asking whether an order is ‘effectively’ unreviewable if review 
is to be left until later.”51
Congress, for its part, began making such value judgments in 1891, when 
it first permitted an appeal of right from “an interlocutory order or decree 
granting or continuing [an] injunction.”
  Of course, the existence of a “substantial public 
interest” is a simple value judgment—a subjective assessment of 
substantiality. 
52  Appeals of right from 
interlocutory orders “refusing” injunctions were authorized four years 
later,53 and appeals of right from interlocutory decrees in admiralty cases 
were authorized in 1926.54
 
 48. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1946 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 
U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 
  In 1948, when reorganizing the Judicial Code, 
Congress also established the right of appeal from certain interlocutory 
 49. See, e.g., Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 873 (“We have, after all, acknowledged that 
virtually every right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal might loosely 
be described as conferring a ‘right not to stand trial.’” (quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. 
United States, 489 U.S. 794, 802 (1989))); see also Waters, supra note 9, at 567 (“[C]ourts 
may not consider the added delay or expense of unnecessary litigation in determining 
whether a ruling qualifies for collateral order treatment.”). But see Davidson, supra note 10, 
at 206–11 (arguing that the right not to stand trial is a substantial right that justifies exercise 
of appellate jurisdiction, under the collateral-order doctrine, over orders denying summary 
judgment); Redish, supra note 25, at 118–19 (discussing Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 
U.S. 148 (1964)) (the Supreme Court has occasionally, albeit only implicitly, recognized that 
the “expense of preparing and conducting a trial which might ultimately prove unnecessary” 
is harm enough to justify the right of immediate appeal). 
 50. See Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 873–81 (holding that a trial court’s disregard of the 
right to avoid trial under a settlement agreement is not important enough for immediate 
appellate review under the collateral-order doctrine); see also Steinman, supra note 15, at 
1255–56 (“The only plausible basis for distinguishing” between immunity and settlement “is 
a value judgment about which right is more deserving of immediate appellate correction.  
Reasonable people may disagree about how to rank these two rulings, but it is complete 
fiction to say that one is a ‘final decision’ and the other is not.” (quoting Digital Equip., 511 
U.S. at 864)). 
 51. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 353 (2006) (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). 
 52. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat. 826, 828 (1891) (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006)); see also Balt. Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 
U.S. 176, 180 (1955) (“The provision for interlocutory appeals was first introduced in 1891 
when the circuit courts of appeals were established as intermediate appellate courts.”). 
 53. Act of Feb. 18, 1895, ch. 96, 28 Stat. 666, 666–67 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1)).  Curiously, the right to appeal from orders refusing injunctions was effectively 
repealed in 1900, see Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 803, 31 Stat. 660, and then reinstated in 1911. 
See All Writs Act, Pub. L. No. 61-475, ch. 231, § 129, 36 Stat. 1087, 1134 (1911); see also 
Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 180 n.6 (“This [1900] amendment had the effect of repealing 
the 1895 provision which was restored in § 129 of the Judicial Code of 1911.”). 
 54. Act of Apr. 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-89, ch. 102, 44 Stat. 233, 233–34 (current 
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3)). 
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orders involving receiverships.55  In an effort to glean meaning from these 
enactments, the Supreme Court in 1955 found “[n]o discussion of the 
underlying reasons for modifying the rule of finality . . . in the legislative 
history.”56  The Court nevertheless inferred that “the changes seem plainly 
to spring from a developing need to permit litigants to effectually challenge 
interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence.”57
Of course, that language—“serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence”—
begs the question.  As with the collateral-order doctrine, these statutorily 
created rights of appeal have hinged on a determination of importance.  But 
the determination is inherently subjective; the words “serious” and 
“irreparable” identify the dividing line but offer no guidance on the value 
judgments that identify where to draw it and when the competing 
considerations of judicial economy outweigh the need for immediate 
review.
 
58  The value judgments are “based on preference, personal 
experience, or even bias, [and some] may have a greater distaste for certain 
types of irreparable harm than others.”59
The most recent statutory expansion of interlocutory appeals of right 
illustrates the point.  In 1988, Congress authorized appeals of right from 
interlocutory orders that refuse to enforce contractual arbitration clauses.
  Those particular policy choices 
have ultimately been made each time Congress has expanded mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction by statute or the Supreme Court has recognized a 
category of collateral orders. 
60  
But the same legislation that created the immediate right to appeal from an 
order denying arbitration specified that interlocutory orders enforcing 
arbitration rights are not immediately appealable.61
 
 55. Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 
646, §§ 1291–94, 62 Stat. 869, 929–30 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(2)). 
  Presumably, Congress 
drew a distinction between enforcing and refusing to enforce arbitration 
rights after concluding that an erroneous decision to refer a matter to 
 56. Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 181.  The Supreme Court seems to have ignored the 
legislative history that establishes a Congressional concern with outsized district court 
power, at least in the legislative history of the Evarts Act. See Paul D. Carrington & Roger 
C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:  Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme 
Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 592 (2009) (“At the time of the enactment [of the Evarts 
Act], Congress was concerned with the excesses of judicial discretion vested in federal trial 
judges that had resulted from the weakness of a system of appellate review that depended 
entirely on the Supreme Court.”). 
 57. Balt. Contractors, 348 U.S. at 181 (emphasis added). 
 58. Similarly, in 1984, Professor Paul D. Carrington proposed permitting a right of 
interlocutory appeal “when essential to protect substantial rights which cannot be effectively 
enforced on review after final decision.” Carrington, supra note 32, at 167.  The difficulty, of 
course, is coming to agreement on defining those rights. 
 59. Glynn, supra note 17, at 245–46. 
 60. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019(a), 
102 Stat. 4642, 4671 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2006)).  Under this 
statute, a defendant who loses a motion to compel arbitration “can take an immediate appeal 
of the district court’s order.” Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1366; see also Arthur Andersen 
LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 1900 (2009); Martineau, supra note 26, at 734–35. 
 61. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1019(b), 
102 Stat. 4642, 4671 (1988) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § 16(b)). 
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arbitration can effectively be corrected after the arbitration proceeding is 
concluded, so there is no immediate, perhaps irreparable, consequence (or 
important right lost) by proceeding unnecessarily with arbitration—or, if 
there is, the need for judicial economy outweighs the need for immediate 
vindication.  By contrast, Congress implicitly concluded that an erroneous 
refusal to refer a matter to arbitration results in an immediate deprivation of 
rights that a later appeal cannot remedy.  In effect, Congress made a 
subjective determination that the right to avoid trial is as significant in the 
arbitration context as the Supreme Court (subjectively) held it to be in the 
immunity context.  That legislative value judgment was particularly 
important, because it essentially overrode judicial determinations that the 
refusal to enforce an arbitration clause did not give rise to mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine.62
Thus, the absolute right of appellate review under the collateral-order 
doctrine and the statutory-based exceptions to the final-judgment rule share 
a common trait.  They reflect a decision by the Court (in the case of the 
collateral-order doctrine) and Congress (in the cases of statutory-based 
jurisdiction) to craft a rule permitting immediate access to appellate courts 
in every circumstance that comes within the rule.  Their sweep is broad; if a 
particular type of order is a collateral order, for example, then it is always 
immediately appealable regardless of the specific facts that enhance or 
minimize the need for immediate review in a particular case.
 
63
Litigants and courts may struggle to determine whether a particular case 
comes within the rule, as we see from the numerous Supreme Court 
decisions construing and reshaping the collateral-order doctrine.
  In 
evaluating appellate jurisdiction, courts have the power to decide whether a 
particular order falls within the rule, but they have no discretion to deny 
appellate jurisdiction over orders that do. 
64  But 
these disputes are around the edges.  The larger, subjective policy choices 
provide an overarching sense of predictability and uniformity, and they 
ensure that interlocutory orders fitting the established criteria will always 
enjoy the benefits of immediate review.65
Over the last few decades, we have seen no expansion of mandatory 
appellate jurisdiction.  Instead, we have seen Congress play hot potato over 
the issue by vesting in the Supreme Court the power, through its rulemaking 
authority, to expand mandatory appellate jurisdiction through new 
 
 
 62. See, e.g., Alascom, Inc. v. ITT N. Elec. Co., 727 F.2d 1419, 1421 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Langley v. Colonial Leasing Co., 707 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1983). 
 63. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009) (quoting Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978)). 
 64. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350–53 (2006) (discussing cases); see also 
Chung, supra note 47, at 158 (explaining that the Court at least on one occasion “abandoned 
strict adherence to its three-prong test for the collateral order exception” and instead “used a 
form of heightened constitutional scrutiny—weighing ‘the severity of [governmental] 
intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue’” (quoting Sell v. United 
States, 539 U.S. 166, 177 (2003))). 
 65. But see Steinman, supra note 15, at 1256–57 (inconsistent application of the 
collateral-order doctrine has rendered it “in practice . . . discretionary rather than 
mandatory”). 
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categories of appealable interlocutory orders66 and through expanded 
definitions of “final” orders under § 1291.67  The Supreme Court has never 
exercised these powers.68
2.  Discretionary Appellate Jurisdiction, Whereby the Supreme Court or 
Congress Has Delegated to the Lower Courts the Task of Making Case-by-
Case Value Judgments 
 
Some individual orders that are worthy of immediate appeal fall outside 
the broad categories that govern mandatory appellate jurisdiction.  In 
navigating the delicate balance between meaningful appellate review and 
avoiding piecemeal appeals, Congress and the Supreme Court have created 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders,  but the 
lower courts hold the power to permit or deny review in a particular case.  
For these discretionary appeals, the value judgments and balancing tests are 
conducted on a case-by-case basis rather than in broad categories, and they 
are conducted by the lower courts, not by Congress or the Supreme Court.  
In these situations, appellate jurisdiction is governed by flexible standards 
rather than hard-and-fast rules. 
There are five principal routes to discretionary appellate review over 
interlocutory orders, and they are a motley crew.69  Perhaps the most 
commonly attempted route is certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
Enacted in 1958,70 the statute permits appeals from interlocutory orders in 
civil cases if both the trial court and the court of appeals believe the order 
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the 
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”71
The Court has also promulgated a rule, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(b), that permits a trial court to enter final judgment “as to one or more, 
but fewer than all, claims or parties” by “expressly determin[ing] that there 
is no just reason for delay.”
  
The would-be appellant must identify a discrete issue of law and persuade 
both the trial court and the appellate court that immediate review is 
warranted. 
72
 
 66. Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 
4506, 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006)). 
  While the entry of final judgment under Rule 
54(b) creates an appeal of right, the threshold decision whether to invoke 
 67. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 315, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5115 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006)). 
 68. The Supreme Court has used its delegated power to expand only discretionary 
appellate jurisdiction by rule and has done so only once. See infra text accompanying notes 
80–85; see also Steinman, supra note 15, at 1239 (the Supreme Court’s “rulemaking 
authority has remained largely dormant”). 
 69. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 70. Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b)); see also Steinman, supra note 15, at 1244–45. 
 71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  An analogous statute permits certification of interlocutory 
appeals in bankruptcy cases. See id. § 158(d)(2)(A). 
 72. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
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the rule is left to the district court’s discretion.73
A court of appeals also has the power to issue a writ of mandamus 
commanding a trial court to confine itself to “‘a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction.’”
  Because Rule 54(b) 
applies only to orders that resolve entire claims, it has no reliable 
application to the kinds of MDL orders described in this Article. 
74  This power springs from the language of 28 
U.S.C. § 1651(a),75 which authorizes federal courts to “issue all writs 
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and 
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”76  The Supreme Court has 
cautioned that the writ of mandamus is “a ‘drastic and extraordinary’ 
remedy ‘reserved for really extraordinary causes.’”77  “[W]hether to grant 
the writ is always up to the appellate court’s discretion,”78 and the standards 
“defy precision.”79
The fourth avenue of discretionary review over interlocutory orders is 
unique to a particular category—class-certification orders.  The Supreme 
Court promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) in 1998, 
conferring on appellate courts discretionary jurisdiction over “an order 
granting or denying class-action certification.”
 
80  Twenty years earlier, the 
Court had refused to deem class-action orders categorically “final” under 
the collateral-order doctrine, even while recognizing that “[c]ertification of 
a large class may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and 
litigation costs that he may find it economically prudent to settle and to 
abandon a meritorious defense.”81  While class-certification orders were 
sometimes reviewed under an appellate court’s mandamus power82
 
 73. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980). 
 or under 
 74. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Roche v. Evaporated 
Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).  The Court has also held that a writ of mandamus may 
be appropriate to resolve an “issue of first impression.” Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 
104, 111 (1964).  The Cheney decision cited Schlagenhauf and distinguished, but did not 
overrule, that aspect of its holding. See Cheney, 542 U.S. at 391.  Commentators have 
observed that the Supreme Court’s mandamus jurisprudence has sent “inconsistent 
messages” as to the appropriate standard. E.g., Steinman, supra note 15, at 1264. 
 75. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Rules of Decisions Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, ch. 
47, 62 Stat. 869, 944 (1948) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)). 
 76. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). 
 77. Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380 (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259–60 (1947)); see 
also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 15.11 (4th ed. 2004) (“Appellate courts grant these 
writs rarely, limiting them to situations where the trial court has clearly committed legal 
error, and a party is entitled to relief but cannot obtain it through other means.” (citing Kerr 
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402–03 (1976))); Davidson, supra note 10, at 199 
(“Although frequently sought, writs of mandamus rarely are issued.” (citing Allied Chem. 
Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980); Doughty v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 
6 F.3d 856, 865 (1st Cir. 1993); In re United States, 10 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 1993))). 
 78. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1265. 
 79. Glynn, supra note 17, at 200–01; see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 758 (“[T]he 
different standards applied by the circuits lead to different results.”). 
 80. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).  The promulgation of Rule 23(f) was the first (and so far only) 
instance of Supreme Court rulemaking on interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, as authorized 
by the Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 101, 106 Stat. 
4506, 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) (2006)); see also supra note 68. 
 81. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978). 
 82. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995). 
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§ 1292(b),83 the promulgation of Rule 23(f) reflected the prevailing view 
that these avenues were often inadequate.84  Under Rule 23(f), the court of 
appeals examines each petition to determine whether, in its sole discretion, 
the benefits of interlocutory review in a particular case outweigh the costs.  
The appellate courts have not articulated uniform standards for conducting 
that cost-benefit analysis; there are “disparate Rule 23(f) standards among 
circuits.”85
The final category of discretionary jurisdiction, like Rule 23(f), is unique 
to class actions.  With the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,
 
86 Congress 
conferred discretionary appellate jurisdiction over orders remanding or 
refusing to remand class actions from federal court back to state court if the 
case was originally filed in state court and subsequently removed.87  Once 
again, the decision whether to accept an appeal implicates the appellate 
court’s subjective assessment of the “balance of relevant harms.”88
All of these routes of discretionary appellate jurisdiction can open the 
appellate courthouse doors to litigants who successfully tug at the 
heartstrings of the court of appeals or the district court (or sometimes both) 
with a plea for immediate review.  But the jurisdictional pleas often fall on 
deaf ears.  Trial judges who eschew appellate review can consistently refuse 
to certify legal questions for discretionary review under § 1292(b), 
rendering that avenue “useless.”
 
89
 
 83. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1996). 
  Even when trial courts certify, the 
 84. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1778 n.4 (2010) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Rule 23(f), “adopted in response to Coopers & Lybrand, gives 
Courts of Appeals discretion to permit an appeal from an order granting or denying class-
action certification.”). 
 85. Charles R. Florest, Appealing Class Action Certification Decisions Under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 27, 57 (2007); see also Barry 
Sullivan & Amy Kobelski Trueblood, Rule 23(f):  A Note on Law and Discretion in the 
Courts of Appeals, 246 F.R.D. 277, 284–85 (2008) (explaining that most decisions on Rule 
23(f) petitions fail to explain the courts’ reasons for accepting or rejecting the interlocutory 
appeals). 
 86. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
 87. See id. § 5, 119 Stat. at 12 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c) (2006)); see also 
Steinman, supra note 15, at 1245–46. 
 88. E.g., Coll. of Dental Surgeons v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 
2009). 
 89. Waters, supra note 9, at 558 (Section 1292(b)’s “usefulness in the mass tort context 
is undermined by the fact that it permits interlocutory review only if the trial judge agrees to 
certify the order to the court of appeals.”); see RICHARD H. FIELD, BENJAMIN KAPLAN & 
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1567 (10th ed. 
2010) (“District court certificates under § 1292(b) are rare . . . .”); Bergeron, supra note 33, 
at 1368 (“Permissive interlocutory review continues to be rarely invoked by district 
judges . . . .”); Davidson, supra note 10, at 197 (“[I]n practice, district and circuit courts 
permit few section 1292(b) appeals.”); Glynn, supra note 17, at 266 (“District court 
certification is rare. . . . Indeed, the district court judge has strong incentives to refuse 
certification . . . [and] circuit courts inexplicably refuse to hear many certified questions.”); 
Martineau, supra note 26, at 766 (“[C]onditioning an interlocutory appeal on a trial judge 
certifying an order for appeal is inadequate because the judge may lack sufficient 
objectivity.”); Redish, supra note 25, at 97 (“Because ‘[t]he trial judge is in a unique position 
of authority over the day-to-day actions of individuals,’ . . . ‘[m]egalomania is an 
occupational hazard of the judicial office.’” (quoting Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets 
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appellate courts typically refuse to accept the appeals;90 as a result, appeals 
under § 1292(b) “comprise well fewer than one percent of all appeals.”91  
And the law provides no meaningful standard for knowing when a court 
will permit discretionary interlocutory review; the Supreme Court candidly 
has acknowledged that a discretionary standard permits “[t]he appellate 
court [to] deny the appeal for any reason, including docket congestion.”92  
Thus, “[d]espite the Court’s frequent reference to section 1292(b), 
commentators generally discount its effectiveness as a safety valve for 
interlocutory appeals, since it has been historically utilized infrequently.”93  
Appellate courts are even more grudging in their willingness to entertain a 
petition for a writ of mandamus;94 in fiscal year 2000, for example, only 
2.3% of mandamus petitions succeeded, translating to about 1.33 successful 
mandamus petitions per circuit per year.95
Ultimately the standard in discretionary appeals boils down to whether 
the court wants to hear the case.  For the most part, we can live with that.  
We want courts to accept appeals from interlocutory orders that raise a 
“serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence,” but we do not want to burden 
them by requiring them to hear appeals from orders that do not.  Many 
cases defy easy categorization, so the discretionary standard, while 
imperfect, provides needed flexibility.  But when we can identify categories 
of cases in which the infrequency and unpredictability of discretionary 
review are unacceptable, the discretionary standard is inadequate.  In those 
cases, any meaningful right of appellate jurisdiction must be in the form of 
a mandatory rule, leaving the courts no discretion to keep the door closed. 
 
 
and the Courts of Appeals:  The Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 
HARV. L. REV. 542, 550 (1969))); Robertson, supra note 22, at 762 (“From the district 
court’s perspective, there is little incentive to certify orders for appeal; an interlocutory 
appeal increases the opportunities for reversal . . . .”). 
 90. See, e.g., Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1368 (district court judge certifications are 
“rarely accepted by their appellate colleagues”); Glynn, supra note 17, at 246 (“[T]he rate at 
which circuit courts grant review of orders certified under § 1292(b) . . . is surprising[ly] 
low.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 734 (“[I]n a substantial percentage of cases the courts of 
appeals exercise their discretion to refuse to hear appeals certified by a district court under 
section 1292(b).”); Nagel, supra note 42, at 219 (“Section 1292(b) is seldom a successful 
route to an interlocutory appeal.”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1174 (“Perhaps the most 
telling characteristic of section 1292(b) appeals, however, is how few certified appeals are 
accepted by the circuit courts.”). 
 91. FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 89, at 1567. 
 92. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 475 (1978). 
 93. Solimine, supra note 33, at 1193; see also Martineau, supra note 26, at 768 
(“[Section 1292] grants the district court and the court of appeals too much discretion to 
deny certification and applications for review.” (citing Redish, supra note 25, at 108–09)); 
Waters, supra note 9, at 559 (Section 1292(b) “may be inadequate in many modern complex 
cases.”).  The discretion to deny review is particularly ironic given the de novo standard of 
review that applies to issues of law that an appellate court reviews if it accepts an appeal 
under § 1292(b).  In effect, the discretionary standard for getting in the door undermines the 
rigorous standard of substantive review. 
 94. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 95. FIELD, KAPLAN & CLERMONT, supra note 89, at 1579. 
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C.  The Commentators’ and Reformers’ Primary Focus:  Expanding 
Discretionary, Rather Than Mandatory, Appellate Jurisdiction 
There is certainly no shortage of commentators willing to criticize the 
existing rules of appellate jurisdiction.96  Professor Adam N. Steinman 
posits that “[a]ppellate jurisdiction over interlocutory trial-court rulings is 
among the most troublesome issues in civil procedure.”97  Many 
commentators focus on the inconsistent application of, and the labyrinthian 
exceptions to, the defined rules.98  Professor Paul D. Carrington has 
criticized “the reluctance of courts of appeals to be candid in 
acknowledging the nature and regularity of the exceptions being made” to 
the final-judgment rule.99  A major focus of these commentators is “to 
inquire whether all this complexity can be simplified.”100
Commentators who look beyond the complexity and focus on the scope 
of available appellate review almost uniformly agree that existing avenues 
for interlocutory appeal are inadequate.
 
101  By and large, however, those 
who would expand appellate jurisdiction advocate expanding avenues of 
discretionary appeal.102  Some scholars would even replace the current 
blend of mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction with an all-discretionary 
system.103  Most believe that the dual-discretion system of § 1292(b) should 
be replaced by a system that vests sole discretion in the court of appeals—
as the drafters of § 1292(b) originally proposed in 1958.104
 
 96. See Howard B. Eisenberg & Alan B. Morrison, Discretionary Appellate Review of 
Non-Final Orders:  It’s Time To Change the Rules, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 285, 291 
(1999) (“There is widespread dissatisfaction with the present state of the law regarding 
appeals from non-final orders.”); see also Martineau, supra note 
  These 
26, at 748–70 (describing 
various proposals for change). 
 97. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1237; see also id. at 1241 (lamenting the “host of 
conceptual, doctrinal, and procedural problems” in the current system). 
 98. See, e.g., Carrington, supra note 32, at 165–66 (lamenting “the unconscionable 
intricacy of the existing law”); Nagel, supra note 42, at 200 (describing “widespread” 
dissatisfaction with the “patchwork of exceptions to the final judgment rule”); Redish, supra 
note 25, at 91 (the federal courts’ “pragmatic approach” to appellate jurisdiction “has given 
rise to considerable confusion”); Robertson, supra note 22, at 736 (“[I]t is not surprising that 
some courts, frustrated with the current scheme, have expressed a desire for greater 
uniformity.”); Steinman, supra note 15, at 1238–39 (collecting other authorities). But see 
Glynn, supra note 17, at 201 (“Today, contrary to common belief, the existing exceptions are 
relatively clear and easy for federal courts and litigants to understand and apply.  They 
therefore produce little controversy or collateral litigation in the circuit courts.”). 
 99. Carrington, supra note 32, at 166. 
 100. E.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 157. 
 101. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 25, at 92 (“[E]xisting exceptions to the [finality] 
rule . . . do not adequately serve the interests of justice in many instances.”). 
 102. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 161; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at 
287; Martineau, supra note 26, at 788; Nagel, supra note 42, at 201. 
 103. See, e.g., Carleton M. Crick, The Final Judgment As a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE 
L.J. 539, 564 (1932); Dalton, supra note 19, at 97–107 (reserving mandatory appeal, even 
after final judgment, for limited categories of cases); see also Martineau, supra note 26, at 
775 (describing proposals “to eliminate completely the right to appeal, and to make all 
judgments and orders, both final and interlocutory, appealable only in the discretion of the 
court of appeals”). 
 104. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1171–72.  The discretionary-appeal movement 
resulting in § 1292(b) began in earnest in 1951, when “Judge Jerome Frank . . . presented a 
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reformers believe that trial judges can never serve as adequate gate-keepers 
of appellate review when they have a vested interest in preventing reversal, 
but they retain confidence in the ability of the appellate courts to exercise 
discretion when appropriate.105
The American Bar Association (ABA) has twice advanced proposals for 
vesting sole discretion in the court of appeals.  The first proposal, in 1977, 
would have replaced § 1292(b) with a standard directed exclusively to the 
appellate courts’ discretion;
 
106 Wisconsin adopted this standard in 1978, but 
no other jurisdiction has done so.107  And in 1989, the ABA contemplated, 
and then withdrew, a proposal for discretionary appellate review of 
interlocutory orders in mass-tort cases as part of a larger, unsuccessful 
proposal to nationalize mass-tort litigation.108  The American Law Institute 
made a similar suggestion for discretionary review in connection with its 
1993 recommendations for managing complex litigation.109
Some commentators have advocated a greater resort to the writ of 
mandamus as a means of securing discretionary interlocutory review.
 
110  
Professor Melissa A. Waters, for example, advocates the application of 
various factors—irreparable harm, errors by the district court, and novelty 
of the legal issues involved—to test whether an interlocutory trial-court 
order in a mass-tort case is worthy of mandamus review.111
 
proposal to the United States Judicial Conference that a court of appeals be granted 
discretion to review an interlocutory order if it finds that review is necessary to avoid 
substantial injustice.” Martineau, supra note 
  Professor 
26, at 751 (citing Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States 32 (1951)); see also Nagel, 
supra note 42, at 215 n.116. 
 105. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 29, at 159; Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at 
301–02; Robertson, supra note 22, at 773. 
 106. ABA COMM’N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO 
APPELLATE COURTS § 3.12(b), at 25 (1977).  The ABA’s 1977 proposal permitted 
discretionary appeals for any interlocutory order if the appeal would “(1) Materially advance 
the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein; (2) Protect a party 
from substantial and irreparable injury; or (3) Clarify an issue of general importance in the 
administration of justice.” Id.; see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 773–74. 
 107. Martineau, supra note 26, at 777 (citing WIS. STAT. ANN. § 808.03 (West Supp. 
1992)); see also Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 96, at 297–302 (lauding the Wisconsin 
system).  Wisconsin’s experience is of limited utility in fashioning an appropriate system of 
interlocutory review for significant MDL orders. See infra note 322. 
 108. The ABA’s recommendation would have authorized “[a] Court of Appeals [to] 
permit an appeal to be taken from an interlocutory order of a transferee court entered [in an 
MDL case] if application therefor is made within ten days after entry of such order.” ABA 
COMM’N ON MASS TORTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES app. D at 7d (1989).  But 
the overall proposal was met with numerous concerns surrounding state sovereignty, so the 
ABA House of Delegates initially voted to “defer consideration of the package until the 
commission addresses some of these concerns.” See 58 U.S.L.W. 2109 (Aug. 22, 1989).  The 
proposal was later withdrawn. See 58 U.S.L.W. 2477 (Feb. 20, 1990). 
 109. AM. LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION:  STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
ANALYSIS § 3.07(C), at 130  (1994); id. § 3.07(C) cmt. D at 138–41. 
 110. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 9, at 591. 
 111. See id. at 594 (quoting Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court, 557 F.2d 650, 654–55 (9th Cir. 
1977)); see also id. at 596–98 (elaborating on factors).  But Professor Waters cautions that 
mandamus should not “‘expand[] into a method of permissive interlocutory appeal.’” Id. at 
593 (quoting 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3933, at 527 (2d ed. 1996)). 
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Robertson has advocated the use of mandamus in cases involving discovery 
of privileged matter if the trial court refuses to certify a discretionary appeal 
under § 1292(b).112  And Professor Steinman believes that appellate courts 
already possess, and need to begin to use, the full power to exercise 
discretionary appellate review under § 1651.113
These suggested routes of discretionary appellate jurisdiction are 
sufficient in certain circumstances, particularly when the trial-court order 
has minimal impact or reflects the exercise of the trial court’s own 
discretion.  But when a trial court commits an error of law that has an 
outsized impact, the availability of immediate appellate review should not 
depend on the subjective value judgments of a single appellate panel 
deciding a petition for discretionary review or for a writ of mandamus. 
  
While the occasional scholar has expressed skepticism of the all-
discretionary solution,114 only one commentator, Professor Timothy P. 
Glynn, has offered a comprehensive explanation for why “discretionary 
review is the wrong approach” and urged the adoption of a system of 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction for certain types of interlocutory orders.115  
As Professor Glynn demonstrates, it is not only the trial courts, but also the 
appellate courts, that inhibit access to discretionary review.116  A 
discretionary system is too vulnerable to the whims and prejudices of 
individual judges who deny discretionary appeals in cases they wish to 
avoid117 and have no obligation to justify or explain why they do so.118
The dangers of a discretionary system are not limited to the injustices 
that can occur in an individual case.  The detriment to the judicial system is 
far more insidious.  A discretionary standard ensures that access to 
interlocutory review will depend on the luck of the judicial draw.  Two 
cases may present identical facts, issues, and arguments for immediate 
review, but only one may succeed.  That inconsistency undermines the 
  At 
the very least, it leaves important value judgments—judgments that should 
be made on a global level in certain cases—in the hands of the random 
panel of judges assigned to accept or reject discretionary review in a 
particular case. 
 
 112. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 778–79. 
 113. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1242–43; see also id. at 1278–86.  Professor 
Steinman believes that his construction of § 1651 could supplant the courts’ resort to the 
collateral-order doctrine and writs of mandamus. 
 114. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 175 (“I do not see the transformation of rules 
into discretion as a positive or promising movement in this context.”). 
 115. Glynn, supra note 17, at 229, 259–62. 
 116. Id. at 241 (“[T]he circuit courts’ surprisingly low rate of review of orders certified 
under § 1292(b) suggests that the circuit courts resist giving themselves more work, even 
when the total impact on their caseloads would be minimal.”); see also supra note 89 and 
accompanying text. 
 117. Glynn, supra note 17, at 252–53 (“In addition to being largely ineffective in serving 
the lawmaking function, discretionary review is dangerous” because “circuit judges easily 
can avoid articulating, reiterating, or enforcing legal principles or conclusions they dislike by 
denying review.”); id. at 245 (“[J]udges may allow personal preferences . . . to creep into 
their decision whether to grant review.”). 
 118. Id. at 249 (“A circuit panel armed with such discretion can ignore reversible error for 
any reason, without comment, and without downstream consequences.”). 
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integrity of our process and our conception of justice.  “The power to decide 
what to decide . . . weakens the influence of precedent and allows personal 
views and preferences to have a greater impact on the application and 
substance of the law.”119  In the end, a discretionary regime leads to the 
twin evils—“procedural unpredictability and substantive uncertainty”—that 
threaten our confidence in legal rules built on stare decisis,120
Professor Glynn thus shares my view that the courts should have no 
discretion to deny appellate jurisdiction over some categories of 
interlocutory orders, which he calls “problem areas.”
 particularly 
when the absence of interlocutory review can have devastating 
consequences. 
121  But Professor 
Glynn has not identified any particular problem areas,122 and other 
commentators have suggested that doing so is “virtually impossible.”123
II.  THE MASSIVE IMPACT OF INTERLOCUTORY LEGAL RULINGS IN MDL 
CASES 
  I 
disagree.  As I demonstrate below, certain kinds of interlocutory orders in 
MDL cases qualify as “problem areas” that courts of appeals should have 
no discretion to refuse to review. 
The need to expand the right of appeal in MDL proceedings stems from 
the exaggerated impact of interlocutory legal decisions in MDL cases.  One 
legal ruling by one judge can reallocate liability risks in thousands of 
individual lawsuits.  That outsized impact is not surprising; the MDL 
system was designed to centralize power for the sake of efficiency, and its 
use has grown spectacularly since its inception.  As I describe in this part, 
the increasing consolidation ratchets up the risk and consequences of legal 
error, rendering both settlement and trial untenable options.  To illustrate 
the point, I examine three questionable interlocutory legal decisions in a 
pending MDL proceeding, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Products Liability Litigation,124
A.  The Purpose, Scope, and Spectacular Growth of MDL Proceedings 
 and the unsuccessful efforts to appeal from 
them. 
The MDL statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, was enacted in 1968 “[t]o provide 
for the temporary transfer to a single district for coordinated or consolidated 
pretrial proceedings of civil actions pending in different districts which 
 
 119. Id. at 253. 
 120. See Robertson, supra note 22, at 759, 770; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 20.4, at 591 (7th ed. 2007) (“[D]ecision in accordance with precedent 
reduces uncertainty about one’s legal rights and obligations.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 
(Alexander Hamilton) (purpose of stare decisis is “[t]o avoid an arbitrary discretion in the 
courts”). 
 121. Glynn, supra note 17, at 259. 
 122. Id. at 261–62. 
 123. E.g., Martineau, supra note 26, at 775. 
 124. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 10, 2000). 
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involve one or more common questions of fact, and for other purposes.”125  
The legislation vested in the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 
(JPML) the “authority to transfer all cases relating to similar litigation to a 
single judge for pretrial proceedings.”126
An MDL proceeding is authorized “[w]hen civil actions involving one or 
more common questions of fact are pending in different districts,” when 
“transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and 
witnesses,” and when transfers “will promote the just and efficient conduct 
of such actions.”
 
127  A party or the JPML itself may initiate MDL 
proceedings.128  The JPML bases its decision to consolidate cases into an 
MDL “on the number and nature of similar cases pending and likely to be 
filed, with importance given to whether it will further the ultimate 
resolution of the litigation.”129  Parties and counsel involved in potential 
“tag-along actions”—that is, subsequently filed actions involving the same 
“common questions of fact”130—are required to notify the JPML of the new 
actions,131 which are then conditionally transferred into the MDL through a 
summary process.132  Though consolidated for pretrial purposes, each 
action aggregated within the MDL proceeding remains a separate action, 
“theoretically independent” from the others.133  A judge in an MDL 
proceeding may choose to accelerate some of these actions by denominating 
them “‘focus actions’ for early discovery and trial within the MDL.”134
MDL consolidation inevitably centralizes in the transferee judge the 
power to render the important legal decisions.  While the consolidation 
standard under § 1407(a) is the existence of “common questions of fact,” 
and while “greater complexity of factual issues” increases the likelihood of 
 
 
 125. Multidistrict Litigation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-296, 82 Stat. 109 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006)). 
 126. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2209 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000)); see also Courtney 
E. Silver, Note, Procedural Hassles in Multidistrict Litigation:  A Call for Reform of 28 
U.S.C. § 1407 and the Lexecon Result, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 455 (2009).  The MDL statute 
tracked a consolidation trend that simultaneously took place within the judicial districts; 
while cases are now assigned immediately to a single judge from the moment of filing, cases 
before the late 1960s “were not assigned to any particular judge until they were ready for 
trial,” so “judges shared responsibility for resolving pretrial matters.” Steven S. Gensler, 
Judicial Case Management:  Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674–75 (2010). 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a); see also Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of 
Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG. 47, 51–56 
(2007); Silver, supra note 126, at 456. 
 128. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c). 
 129. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2210. 
 130. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation [hereinafter 
J.P.M.L. R.P.] 1.1. 
 131. J.P.M.L. R.P. 7.1(a), 7.2(a). 
 132. J.P.M.L. R.P. 7.1(b); see also Oakley, supra note 7, at 499. 
 133. See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort 
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 269, 281–82. 
 134. See Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 522 F. Supp. 2d 557, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  Note that an action may be 
tried by the MDL court only if that action was originally filed in that court. See infra note 
175. 
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MDL consolidation,135 the MDL system is “flexible” and allows for 
“transfer and consolidation based on pragmatic considerations.”136  Thus, 
the JPML’s decisions suggest that the presence of “complex legal . . . 
questions” also weighs in favor of initiating an MDL proceeding.137  
Indeed, when the JPML declines MDL consolidation, it often bases its 
decision on the failure of the “proponents of centralization . . . to persuade 
[it] that any common questions of fact and law are sufficiently complex 
and/or numerous to justify Section 1407 transfer.”138
The magnitude of the MDL system is reflected both in the broad 
categories of cases consolidated into MDL proceedings
 
139 and in the 
explosive growth in the number of MDLs in the last decade alone.  As to 
breadth, the statute places no limits on the categories of cases that are 
candidates for consolidation, so long as the cases share common facts (and 
law) and meet the other pragmatic considerations.  The JPML has thus 
centralized litigation involving a single disaster, such as an airplane crash140 
or an industrial accident,141 as well as claims resulting from allegations of 
widespread injury from, inter alia, unreasonably dangerous products142 and 
from violations of antitrust,143 securities,144 and consumer-protection 
laws.145  The claims arising out of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
were centralized in MDLs in 2010.146
 
 135. See In re Clark Oil & Refining Corp. Antitrust Litig., 364 F. Supp. 458, 459 
(J.P.M.L. 1973). 
 
 136. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2209. 
 137. See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1378 
(J.P.M.L. 2003) (emphasis added); In re Wireless Tel. Fed. Cost Recovery Fees Litig., 293 
F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (denying transfer on same grounds). 
 138. In re New Century Mortg. Corp. Prescreening Litig., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1383, 1384 
(J.P.M.L. 2007) (emphasis added); see also In re Ins. Indus. Discriminatory Sales Practices 
Litig., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2006) (same). 
 139. For a comprehensive list of all MDL proceedings pending in 2009 or 2010, see U.S. 
JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIGATION 2010, SUMMARY BY DOCKET OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PENDING AS OF SEPT. 
30, 2010, OR CLOSED SINCE OCT. 1, 2009 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MDL STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS], available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/
JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation_2010.pdf. 
 140. See, e.g., In re Air Crash over Makassar Strait, Sulawesi, Indonesia, 626 F. Supp. 2d 
1354 (J.P.M.L. 2009). 
 141. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 
1984, 601 F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.L. 1985). 
 142. See, e.g., In re RC2 Corp. Toy Lead Paint Prods. Liab. Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d 1374 
(J.P.M.L. 2007). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Arbitration Forum Antitrust Litig., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1343 
(J.P.M.L. 2010). 
 144. See, e.g., In re Fairfield Greenwich Group Sec. Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1352 
(J.P.M.L. 2009). 
 145. See, e.g., In re Zicam Cold Remedy Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 655 F. Supp. 2d 
1371 (J.P.M.L. 2009). 
 146. In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon,” MDL No. 2179, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 83268 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 2010) (personal-injury and property-damage claims); In re 
BP p.l.c. Sec. Litig., MDL No. 2185, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83263 (J.P.M.L. Aug. 10, 
2010) (securities-fraud claims). 
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As to growth, the raw numbers illustrate how integral MDL proceedings 
have become to our federal court system.  Between its inception in 1968 
and September 30, 2009, the JPML consolidated 323,258 individual actions 
into MDL proceedings.147  The number of separate actions pending in 
MDLs consistently rose from 39,799 in 2000 to 102,545 in 2008.148  That 
increase of more than 250% between 2000 and 2008 is almost fifteen times 
higher than the seven-percent increase in total civil cases filed in that same 
period (259,517 new cases in 2000 compared with 267,257 in 2008).149
 
 147. JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, 
at tbl.S-20 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 ANNUAL REPORT], available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S20Sep09.pdf. 
  
The growth in the total number of pending (as opposed to new) civil cases 
also pales in comparison to the growth in the number of cases pending in 
MDL proceedings; the total number of all pending civil cases rose only 
17.6% between 2000 (250,202 pending cases) and 2008 (294,122 pending 
 148. Id.; JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/2008/tables/S20Sep08.pdf; JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2007), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2007/tables/S20Sep07.pdf; 
JAMES C. DUFF, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-
20 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics
/JudicialBusiness/2006/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. 
COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2005), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2005/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS 
RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at 
tbl.S-20 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2004/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. 
COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2003), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2003/tables/s20.pdf; LEONIDAS 
RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF U.S. COURTS, 2002 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at 
tbl.S-20 (2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2002/tables/s20sep02.pdf; LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, JUDICIAL BUS. OF 
U.S. COURTS, 2001 ANNUAL REPORT OF DIRECTOR, at tbl.S-20 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 
ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/tables/s20sep01.pdf.  In 2009 and 2010, the number of pending 
actions in the MDL system dropped significantly; the reductions appear largely attributable 
to an unusually high number of terminations in those years, as well as a slight drop in the 
number of actions transferred into MDLs in 2009. See 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
147, at tbl.S-20; 2010 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 139, at 2 (at section entitled 
“Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict Litigation”); U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 2009, SUMMARY BY DOCKET OF 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PENDING AS OF SEPT. 30, 2009, OR CLOSED SINCE OCT. 1, 2008, at 
2 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS], available at 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigati
on_2009.pdf (at section entitled “Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict Litigation”).  The 
number of actions transferred into MDLs rose again in 2010. See 2010 MDL STATISTICAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 139, at 2 (at section entitled “Cumulative Summary of Multidistrict 
Litigation”). 
 149. Compare 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.S-7, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/tables/S07Sep09.pdf, with 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
148, at tbl.S-7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/tables/s07sep01.pdf. 
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cases).150  Thus, by 2008, the 102,545 actions pending in MDLs constituted 
more than a third of all federal civil cases pending in that year—resulting in 
what Professor Waters calls an “unprecedented reallocation of power in 
favor of mass tort trial judges.”151  MDL litigation “is emerging as the 
primary vehicle for the resolution of complex civil cases.”152
B.  The “Serious, Perhaps Irreparable, Consequence” of Legal Error in 
MDL Proceedings 
 
1.  The Untenable Choice Between Settling and Going to Trial in the Face 
of Questionable Legal Rulings 
This increased use of MDL proceedings has “obvious benefits.”153  MDL 
consolidation can reduce legal fees that common defendants would 
otherwise incur in defending claims scattered throughout various federal 
and state courts across the country.154  Discovery, often the most expensive 
phase of litigation,155 can be coordinated to avoid duplication.156  There are 
also obvious efficiencies in having a single judge become an expert on the 
complex factual and legal issues in a particular MDL proceeding, rather 
than requiring multiple judges to learn the facts and the law.157  
Coordinating every action in one place, before one judge, all but eliminates 
the risk of inconsistent rulings.158  And that judge, as an expert in the 
relevant facts and law and with all the parties before her, is perhaps in the 
best position to foster global settlement.159
But MDL consolidation comes at significant cost.  Legal error in pretrial 
rulings has “effects that go far beyond the mere conduct of litigation.”
 
160
 
 150. Compare 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 
  A 
147, at tbl.C, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/St
atistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/appendices/C00Sep09.pdf, with 2001 ANNUAL REPORT, supra 
note 148, at tbl.C, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
JudicialBusiness/2001/appendices/c00sep01.pdf. 
 151. See Waters, supra note 9, at 531. 
 152. Eldon E. Fallon, Jeremy T. Grabill & Robert Pitard Wynne, Bellwether Trials in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2324 (2008). 
 153. Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 522 F. Supp. 2d 557, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 154. Oakley, supra note 7, at 506. 
 155. See, e.g., Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 588 (5th 
Cir. 1992). 
 156. Oakley, supra note 7, at 506. 
 157. See In re MTBE, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 558; Oakley, supra note 7, at 513 (“[T]he 
process becomes more efficient because of the judge’s expertise.”). 
 158. Richard L. Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation?  Toward a 
Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2245, 2270 (2008); see also, e.g., In re Preferential Drug Prods. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 429 
F. Supp. 1027, 1029 (J.P.M.L. 1977) (consolidating litigation “under the supervision of a 
single court will eliminate the possibilities of . . . inconsistency”); Oakley, supra note 7, at 
507 (suggesting expectation that single judge would “rule uniformly on all discovery and 
pretrial matters” in cases within an MDL). 
 159. See Sherman, supra note 7, at 2223. 
 160. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 162. 
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trial judge, in ruling on a motion to dismiss161 or a motion for summary 
judgment,162 is often required to articulate the law that will govern various 
substantive aspects of the parties’ dispute.  When the trial judge misstates 
the governing law, the parties are forced to choose between two untenable 
alternatives:  (1) an expensive and risky trial conducted under the wrong 
legal standard, with the hope of vindication on appeal after final judgment; 
or (2) an unfavorable settlement, the value of which is artificially increased 
(for defendants) or decreased (for plaintiffs) by the erroneous rulings.  To 
be sure, that particular dilemma always exists, even outside MDL 
proceedings, when a trial court misstates the governing law or “exert[s] 
activist or ideological pressures in ways that would elude appellate 
oversight.”163  But the complexity of MDLs heightens the risk of serious 
error,164 and the number of affected litigants increases the impact of that 
error.  The product of the heightened risk and the heightened impact results 
from the “kingly power” of district court judges, which inspired Congress 
to expand the jurisdiction of the appellate courts in the first place.165  And 
that product is precisely the sort of “serious, perhaps irreparable, 
consequence” that justifies a categorical right to immediate appellate 
review.166
First, and perhaps most obviously, aggregation of the cases also means 
aggregation of the amount at stake.
  There are a number of reasons why. 
167  While an erroneous legal ruling in a 
single lawsuit can render it particularly difficult for a plaintiff to prove 
liability or for a defendant to escape it, the financial impact of the legal 
ruling is confined to that single dispute.  The parties can make rational, if 
imperfect, choices about whether to settle, and no one else will be directly 
affected.  By contrast, pretrial legal rulings in aggregated MDL cases have a 
dramatically larger impact.168
 
 161. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) & 12(c). 
  For example, the diabetes drug Rezulin was 
 162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 163. Gensler, supra note 126, at 678 (citing Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 374, 424–31 (1982)). 
 164. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 160 (MDL cases “involve difficult law” and “pose 
multiple opportunities for error”). 
 165. 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1889) (statement of Rep. David Culberson); see also supra 
note 56. 
 166. See supra notes 56–58 and accompanying text. 
 167. ABA COMM’N ON MASS TORTS, supra note 108, at 74. 
 168. See id.  At first blush, this dynamic can appear to be more relevant to defendants 
than to plaintiffs.  Actions consolidated into MDL proceedings typically have different 
plaintiffs but common defendants, so the defendants have more at stake as a result of the 
aggregated decision-making.  The reality, though, is that most plaintiffs in MDL lawsuits are 
represented by common law firms that are compensated based on the results of the case. See, 
e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 
530 (1994) (“The plaintiffs’ attorneys often will receive a fee based upon a percentage of the 
total [settlement] fund . . . .”); Katherine Dirks, Note, Ethical Rules of Conduct in the 
Settlement of Mass Torts:  A Proposal to Revise Rule 1.8(g), 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 501, 502 
(2008) (“Settlement . . . requires that a limited number of plaintiffs’ law firms each represent 
a large number of clients and coordinate the settlement on their behalf.”); see also 
McCollam, supra note 4, at 48–49 (describing efforts by plaintiffs’ bar to secure “mass” 
representations of clients with claims arising out of 2010 BP oil spill in Gulf of Mexico).  So 
the lawyers, if not the individual plaintiffs, stand to gain or lose significantly from pretrial 
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the subject of over 1800 individual product-liability and fraud lawsuits, 
alleging severe injury and death, that were consolidated within an MDL 
proceeding,169 and every legal ruling that limited or expanded the right of 
recovery had an immediate impact of more than 1800 times what it would 
have had in a single lawsuit.170  Simple mathematics reveal the enormous 
financial impact—into the billions of dollars for compensatory damages 
alone—of a single legal ruling that effectively establishes or precludes 
liability.171
The exaggerated influence of legal rulings works in tandem with the 
MDL judge’s power to effectuate global settlement.  “[T]here is every 
reason to believe that multidistrict centralization increases pressure on 
transferee judges to promote an early settlement (since the MDL process 
creates incentives for judges to treat settlement as the ultimate goal of 
consolidation).”
 
172  The emphasis on settlement within an MDL proceeding 
is unavoidable given the general preference for settlement over trial.173  
There is an obvious additional allure in the prospect of resolving multiple 
cases simultaneously and avoiding an unmanageable number of trials.174
 
legal rulings affecting the strength of their cases. See McCollam, supra note 
  
An MDL judge also knows that if the cases do not settle, they must return 
4, at 65 (lawyer 
for prospective settling BP oil-spill plaintiffs “sounded almost giddy at the prospect of once 
again extracting a sizeable settlement from the oil giant”).  Rightly or wrongly, the lawyers 
have significant influence over settlement decisions.  Thus, the consequences of aggregation 
are effectively the same for plaintiffs as for defendants. 
 169. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 61, 63–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(describing factual allegations and legal theories); 2009 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 148, at 7 (noting, at section entitled “Summary by Docket of Multidistrict Litigation 
Pending As of Sept. 30, 2009, or Closed Since Oct. 1, 2008,” that 1868 cases have been 
consolidated within Rezulin MDL proceedings). 
 170. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 398, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (granting defendants’ motion “to exclude proposed testimony of plaintiffs’ experts 
that Rezulin can cause liver injury, or exacerbate a pre-existing liver condition, in the 
absence of marked elevations of liver enzymes while the patient was taking the 
medication”). 
 171. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 
548 (2005) (describing mean tort awards of around $3,000,000 and median tort awards of 
around $1,000,000 for loss of life); see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–16 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Aggregating millions of claims on 
account of multiple products manufactured and sold across more than ten years makes the 
case so unwieldy, and the stakes so large, that settlement becomes almost inevitable—and at 
a price that reflects the risk of a catastrophic judgment as much as, if not more than, the 
actual merit of the claims.”). 
 172. Moller, supra note 4, at 883; see also id. at 877 (“Put in economic terms, the MDL 
process turns the transferee judge into a kind of central planner, tasked with setting a single 
price (the pay-out that defendants will be forced to pay) for all claims in a one-shot 
proceeding . . . .”); Waters, supra note 9, at 530 (MDL judges decide cases primarily 
“through pretrial rulings and settlement rather than trial”). 
 173. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No:  A Study of Settlement 
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial 
is a failure. . . . With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that 
pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial.”). 
 174. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 77, § 20.132 (MDLs “afford a unique 
opportunity for the negotiation of a global settlement”). 
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to the transferor courts for trial.175  The potential remand creates a further 
incentive to be perceived as the hero who resolved the disputes rather than 
the ineffectual colleague whose inability to achieve a settlement left her 
fellow trial judges with the task of trying each case individually.  This 
“pressure to compel a settlement . . . exists independently of the value of the 
claims at issue.”176  And the numbers bear out the dynamic:  of the 235,258 
cases that have exited the MDL system since 1968, 223,126 were 
terminated by the transferee court and only 12,132, or about five percent, 
were remanded to the transferor court for trial.177
The legal rulings in that pro-settlement environment can thus become 
tools for exerting settlement pressure on the parties.  And therein lies the 
danger.  “Many [MDL] judges view their role as ‘getting the parties to a 
claims process’—a settlement—as quickly as possible.  Confronted with 
such a judge, the client can no longer hope to prevail simply because it has 
done nothing wrong.”
 
178  An MDL judge holds the power, with a single 
decision, to dramatically recast the risk of liability in tens, hundreds, or 
even thousands of cases at a time,179 sometimes using “fuzzy normative 
assumptions”180 that leave the parties with “the painful choice of bearing 
the risk and expense of trial or succumbing to [the] pressures to settle.”181  
And to insulate these rulings from appellate scrutiny, the judge may 
deliberately refuse to certify an interlocutory appeal under § 1292(b), which 
leaves intact the uncertainty and creates additional pressure to settle.182
Centralization in an MDL proceeding also tends to insulate the legal 
rulings from the scrutiny of other trial judges handling similar cases.  
Outside the MDL system, “[f]requent disagreements are inevitable when 
 
 
 175. Silver, supra note 126, at 456 (“Each transferred action is to be remanded to its 
originating district by the [JPML] at or before the conclusion of pretrial proceedings unless it 
is previously terminated.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006))).  In 1998, the Supreme Court 
blocked “the use of MDL for trial consolidation of all the cases.” Sherman, supra note 7, at 
2206 (citing Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998)).  That 
ruling has been widely criticized and has inspired reform efforts that would confer on 
transferee courts the power to try cases transferred to them as part of an MDL. See generally 
Silver, supra note 126, at 479–85. 
 176. Moller, supra note 4, at 878. 
 177. See 2009 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 147, at tbl.S-20; see also Waters, supra note 
9, at 545 (“[T]he MDL device . . . most often results in settlement or other disposition of the 
transferred cases before the transferee judge.”). 
 178. Marcus, supra note 158, at 2288 (quoting Mark Herrmann, To MDL or Not To 
MDL?  A Defense Perspective, LITIG., Summer 1998, at 43, 45) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also AM. LAW INST., supra note 109, at 22 (“Since most cases settle before trial, 
the[] pretrial decisions [in MDL cases] often effectively dispose of the actions.”). 
 179. See, e.g., 2010 MDL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 139 (identifying numbers of 
actions consolidated within each MDL proceeding). 
 180. Moller, supra note 4, at 862. 
 181. Davidson, supra note 10, at 150 (citations omitted). 
 182. Waters, supra note 9, at 558.  Professor Michael E. Solimine describes the 
“cautionary tale” that “emerges from the . . . Agent Orange litigation, where a lack of 
interlocutory appeals certified by the district court judge appeared to play a significant role.” 
Solimine, supra note 33, at 1205–06.  “Judge [Jack] Weinstein used the uncertainty of the 
appellate court’s disposal of the case as an incentive to settle.” Id. at 1206; see also Waters, 
supra note 9, at 550 (“Rather than merely acting as a settlement facilitator, Judge Weinstein 
exerted tremendous pressure on the parties to settle the case.”). 
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649 district judges, reviewed by twelve separate courts of appeals, are all 
independently empowered” to interpret the law.183  Each judge contributes 
to the development of legal thinking and is subjected to the horizontal 
scrutiny of other trial judges grappling with identical issues, leading to 
majority and minority viewpoints and ultimate resolution on appeal.184  But 
the MDL system’s delegation of all pretrial decisionmaking to a single 
judge eliminates the horizontal scrutiny.  Indeed, even when a case returns 
for trial to the court in which it was originally filed,185 that court is unlikely 
to reexamine the MDL judge’s pretrial legal rulings.186  That insulation 
defies the normal expectations we have for our legal system and the 
evolution of the law.187  The consistent application of erroneous law 
propagates error and undermines the cherished practice of negotiating the 
law among multiple jurists rather than allowing one judge to dictate it for 
everyone.  The JPML implicitly recognizes the importance of selecting the 
right judge188 and often “transfers complex cases to judges experienced in 
handling complex and multidistrict litigation.”189
 
 183. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 495 (1996) (expressing the concept in the context of “ambiguous criminal 
statutes”). 
  But the fact remains that 
a single judge makes all of the important pretrial decisions for all the 
 184. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities:  An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 716 (1984).  As 
Professors Estreicher and Sexton explained: 
Disagreement in the lower courts facilitates percolation—the independent 
evaluation of a legal issue by different courts.  The process of percolation allows a 
period of exploratory consideration and experimentation by lower courts before the 
Supreme Court ends the process with a nationally binding rule.  The Supreme 
Court, when it decides a fully percolated issue, has the benefit of the experience of 
those lower courts. 
Id., quoted in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 n.11 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
see also Moller, supra note 4, at 882 (“The [Supreme] Court has emphasized that 
decentralized decision-making is an important component of our system of checks and 
balances.”). 
 185. See supra note 175 and accompanying text. 
 186. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 77, § 20.133 (“Although the 
transferor judge has the power to vacate or modify rulings made by the transferee judge, 
subject to comity and ‘law of the case’ considerations, doing so in the absence of a 
significant change of circumstances would frustrate the purposes of centralized pretrial 
proceedings.”); Bellevue Drug Co. v. CaremarksPCS, Inc. (In re Pharm. Benefit Managers 
Antitrust Litig.), 582 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not believe that Congress 
intended that a ‘Return to Go’ card would be dealt to parties involved in MDL transfers.”); 
see also, e.g., In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 273–74 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (court “to which an MDL case is transferred or remanded may revisit a transferee 
court’s decision” in “exceptional cases”). 
 187. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 4, at 881 (“[T]he centralized framework of the MDL 
process dampens the proposed due process scrutiny, creating incentives that run against the 
grain of judicial review, if not defusing it altogether in many cases.”). 
 188. Sherman, supra note 7, at 2211 (“Perhaps the most critical decision the Panel has to 
make is the selection of the judge to whom an MDL case is transferred.”). 
 189. Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 127, at 60 (citing In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, 
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 990 F. Supp. 834, 836 (J.P.M.L. 1998)); 
see also, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1101 
(J.P.M.L. 1992). 
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consolidated cases.  The rulings may be consistent across all the cases,190 
but the virtue of consistency has its limits (as Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
famous words remind us).191
Of course, the consolidated judicial power does not require the parties to 
settle.  But the alternative to settlement—taking a case to trial and getting 
an appealable final judgment—is typically not viable.
 
192  By definition, 
trials always involve significant expense of money and time.193  These are 
costs we impose on litigants who choose not to settle, and they are rarely 
perceived as a basis for immediate appeal.194  But a trial in an MDL 
proceeding—even of just one of the consolidated cases—can have 
consequences far more devastating than the litigation expenses, especially if 
conducted according to an erroneous construction of the applicable law.  
One trial result often serves as a bellwether for all of the aggregated 
cases.195  A defense verdict or an award of trivial damages can doom all of 
the plaintiffs’ claims, and the extrapolated results of a large plaintiff’s 
verdict, like a plaintiff’s verdict in a class action, can be ruinous to the 
defendants.196
 
 190. See supra note 
  That extraordinary impact of a single trial result is 
158 and accompanying text. 
 191. See Ralph Waldo Emerson, Self-Reliance (1841), in, e.g., THE SELECTED WRITINGS 
OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 132, 138 (Brooks Atkinson ed., 1992) (“A foolish consistency is 
the hobgoblin of little minds . . . .”).  The danger of consistency in the legal context is that it 
can lull us into a sense of complacency.  For example, one student commentator has 
suggested that the uniformity of rulings in an MDL proceeding has the effect of “reducing 
[the] need to pursue certain interlocutory appeals or motions to reconsider.” Oakley, supra 
note 7, at 507.  My thesis, of course, is the opposite—that the centralization of power in a 
single judge makes it all the more prudent to facilitate interlocutory appellate review. See 
also KOMESAR, supra note 14, at 145 (“[S]pecialization increases the potential for the bias 
associated with substituting ‘expert’ judges for ‘general’ judges.”). 
 192. See Steinman, supra note 15, at 1240 (“[T]here has been a steep decrease in trials 
resulting in appealable final judgments.”). 
 193. See id.; see also Davidson, supra note 10, at 195 (lamenting “the cost and 
unnecessary waste of resources associated with bringing the case to trial when the district 
court should have terminated the litigation at the summary judgment stage”); Redish, supra 
note 25, at 98 (erroneous pretrial ruling “may require the parties to expend substantial 
physical, financial and emotional effort in the preparation and conduct of a trial which may 
later prove to have been worthless”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1176 (“[A]n incorrect 
decision may prolong a case and cause the litigants unnecessary cost and delay in resolving 
their dispute” and “may cause a party considerable economic or legal uncertainty while a 
case proceeds to trial or otherwise terminates in a final judgment.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Federal Civil Appellate Jurisdiction:  An Interlocutory Restatement, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1984, at 13, 190 (“Even though . . . a reversal of the order on 
immediate appeal would dispense with a time-consuming and costly trial, the policy against 
piecemeal litigation prevails.”); Martineau, supra note 26, at 742 (“[T]he trouble and 
expense of litigation, even if the litigation is held to be ultimately unnecessary, are not to be 
taken into consideration in deciding whether an order qualifies as collateral and thus 
appealable.”); Waters, supra note 9, at 567 (“[C]ourts may not consider the added delay or 
expense of unnecessary litigation in determining whether a ruling qualifies for collateral 
order treatment.”); see also supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 195. See, e.g., Fallon, Grabill & Wynne, supra note 152, at 2340–41 (“bellwether trial 
process” provides “a ‘once-in-a-lifetime’ opportunity for the resolution of mass disputes”); 
Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 581 (2008) (“[T]he 
results of the bellwether trials will be extrapolated to the remaining plaintiffs.”). 
 196. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f), advisory committee’s note (1998 amendment) (“An order 
granting certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of 
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particularly troubling when the underlying legal rulings are questionable 
and have never been reviewed by anyone other than the judge who rendered 
them. 
Even a party that can bear the risk of trial and musters up the fortitude to 
try a case to final judgment loses the full value of an appeal by having to 
wait.  For one thing, the fortitude may dissolve once an adverse verdict 
occurs.197  But even a stalwart verdict-loser, undeterred by the trial loss and 
game for the appellate process, would find the appellate court less receptive 
to overturning the erroneous legal ruling precisely to avoid expending 
additional judicial resources on a retrial.198  “[E]ven very doubtful trial-
court rulings that would not have survived interlocutory review are much 
more likely to be upheld at this late stage.”199  The dynamic is more 
pronounced in the MDL context, because appellate courts tend to regard the 
trial judge as the expert.200  In short, the very same policy that the Supreme 
Court has lauded in describing the final-judgment rule—the desire to avoid 
the “oppressive expenses” of “successive appeals”201—becomes an obstacle 
in securing fair appellate review after final judgment.202
The likely result is a settlement at a price that reflects a trial court’s 
mistaken articulation of the governing law, perhaps adjusted slightly to 
reflect the potential for reversal on appeal that will never come.  So a 
defendant, aggrieved by an erroneous legal ruling, will pay more to settle, 
because the prospect of trial is even worse.  A similarly aggrieved plaintiff 
will take less.  And the implications of this mispriced settlement go beyond 
the immediate financial impact to the parties; the mispricing remains a 
lingering anathema to the legal system’s role in encouraging or 
discouraging certain behaviors through economic models.
 
203
 
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”); Coopers & 
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978) (recognizing that “[c]ertification of a large 
class may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that he 
may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense”); see also 
Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding To Decide:  Class Action 
Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1567 (2000) (citing Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D. 559, 565 (1996))).  
  Although 
 197. See In re Chevron USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997) (Jones, J., 
concurring). 
 198. See Cooper, supra note 29, at 160 (“[T]here are great risks . . . that affirmance will 
blink at serious error in order to avoid” the cost of a retrial.). 
 199. Waters, supra note 9, at 552; see also id. at 565 (courts of appeals have “every 
incentive to affirm all but the grossest trial court errors” when a mass-tort case gets to final 
judgment); Dalton, supra note 19, at 80 (“[R]eversals are more likely . . . where retrial would 
be easy, inexpensive, or unnecessary.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Moller, supra note 4, at 879. 
 201. E.g., Canter v. Am. Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307, 318 (1830) (Story, J.). 
 202. This is not to say that appellate courts will never reverse a judgment rendered after 
trial in an MDL case.  Indeed, the Sixth Circuit recently ordered a new trial in an MDL case 
that the trial judge had selected as a bellwether. See Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 
665 (6th Cir. 2010).  But such reversals appear rare.  And the Tamraz case illustrates the 
tremendous waste of resources that could have been avoided—and the true purpose of a 
bellwether case enhanced—if appellate review had been available before trial. 
 203. See generally POSNER, supra note 120, § 21.2, at 594–95. 
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they may be willing to resolve a particular dispute on unfavorable terms, the 
parties are left unsure of their legal obligations going forward,204 and their 
“freedom to plan . . . future conduct” is diminished as a result.205
2.  The Unavailability of Interlocutory Review from Important Legal 
Rulings in MDL Proceedings 
  To the 
extent we rely on the allocation of legal liabilities to influence behavior, we 
either lose that benefit or skew the analysis by failing to offer MDL litigants 
a means of correcting a trial judge’s error of law before settlement. 
The dynamic in the similar context of class actions has led a number of 
judges and commentators to use the pejorative term “blackmail” in 
describing a trial judge’s power in consolidated cases to force a settlement 
through adverse pretrial rulings.  Perhaps the most famous example is Judge 
Richard Posner’s opinion in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.,206 in which 
he observed that “Judge Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called 
settlements induced by a small probability of an immense judgment in a 
class action ‘blackmail settlements.’”207  The “blackmail charge” was 
influential in the promulgation of a rule authorizing interlocutory appellate 
review of certification orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(f).208
But the “blackmail charge” had no impact on the right of appellate 
review under § 1407.
 
209
 
 204. See Moller, supra note 
  Despite the growth in MDL cases and the resulting 
4, at 857. 
 205. Id. at 871; see also Redish, supra note 25, at 98–99 (An actor is left in a “cloud of 
uncertainty surrounding the financial soundness of his business or the legality of his 
practices.”); Solimine, supra note 33, at 1181 (“[C]ertainty as to the procedural or 
substantive law will lead to more settlements than not. . . . [P]arties probably go into most 
litigation expecting the law to be fairly certain or to be made more certain by the judiciary.”). 
 206. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 207. Id. at 1298 (quoting HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:  A GENERAL VIEW 
120 (1973)); see also Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth:  A New 
Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 682 (2005) (“[A] number 
of federal courts have held that aggregating numerous claims into one class action suit puts 
excessive settlement pressure on defendants, and renders class certification tantamount to 
blackmail.”); Waters, supra note 9, at 582 (“[T]he court [in Rhone-Poulenc] addressed the 
‘economic blackmail’ problem that often confronts defendants in mass tort class actions.”). 
 208. Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”:  Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1358 (2003); see also supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text. 
 209. The “blackmail charge” also has not resulted in an expansion of the right of 
interlocutory review from the substantive legal decisions rendered in class actions.  One 
could thus argue that my proposal to expand mandatory interlocutory appellate jurisdiction 
in the MDL context should also apply to similar kinds of orders entered in certified class 
actions, where there is a similar aggregation concern.  I do not necessarily quarrel with that 
suggestion, but I do not believe the need is as compelling, for several reasons.  First, a 
substantial number of class actions would benefit from my proposed expansion of MDL 
appellate jurisdiction, because they are already part of MDL proceedings. See, e.g., Judith 
Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 929 (1995).  That 
should come as no surprise, considering that competing class actions by definition raise 
identical claims that are obvious candidates for MDL consolidation.  Second, to the extent 
that competing class actions are not part of an MDL, the legal rulings are not centralized in a 
single judge, so there remains some measure of horizontal scrutiny that we do not see in the 
MDL setting. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text.  Finally, Rule 23(f), though 
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increase in the power consolidated in individual district court judges, the 
MDL system has no built-in mechanism for scrutiny of any kind—even of 
rulings that are fairly debatable, novel, or outright wrong—until after a case 
reaches final judgment.  A party seeking to obtain review of an 
interlocutory MDL decision must rely on the categories of interlocutory 
appellate jurisdiction that exist for all other cases.  As a result, and as 
Professor Waters has observed, “appellate courts never effectively review 
many of the most controversial rulings and innovations of mass tort trial 
judges.”210
3.  A Case Study:  The Effects of MDL Power Centralization in the MTBE 
Litigation 
  I now provide a palpable example of an MDL in which the trial 
court has made several such controversial rulings and innovations that have 
evaded appellate review. 
In 2000, the JPML created a new MDL proceeding for product-liability 
claims involving MTBE, a gasoline oxygenate.211  The cases were 
consolidated before Judge Shira A. Scheindlin212 in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District New York.213  The plaintiffs are private 
landowners and public and private water providers.214  They allege that 
MTBE, found in gasoline that has leaked or spilled, has contaminated or 
threatens to contaminate the groundwater in their water wells.215  The 
defendants include over fifty gasoline refiners, distributors, and retailers 
from fifteen different states.216
 
not a vehicle for a direct attack on a district court’s substantive legal rulings in class actions, 
at least provides an established mechanism for some degree of immediate appellate review 
(albeit discretionary) from interlocutory orders rendered in class actions and has often served 
as a successful tool for pretrial appellate guidance. See, e.g., Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (affirming class certification), cert. granted in part, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3342 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2010) (No. 10-277).  The decision to transfer a case to an 
MDL, by contrast, is reviewable only if a party can convince an appellate court to entertain 
the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (2006); see also supra 
notes 
  As of January 2011, a total of 178 MTBE 
94–95 and accompanying text.  
 210. Waters, supra note 9, at 530–31. 
 211. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1358, 2000 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 10, 2000). 
 212. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin is perhaps best known for her groundbreaking decisions 
governing the allocation of costs to conduct discovery of electronically stored information. 
See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  Before 
becoming a district judge, she served as a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York, where she worked closely with Judge Weinstein on the Agent 
Orange MDL. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 752 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 213. In re MTBE, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14901, at *4. 
 214. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 
364 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. at 362, 364, 382. 
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cases, originally filed in nineteen different states,217 had been consolidated 
before Judge Scheindlin.218
The underlying factual allegations of the lawsuits relate to MTBE’s use 
as a gasoline oxygenate.  In the 1990s, in response to legislation amending 
the Clean Air Act,
 
219 gasoline refiners began widely using MTBE to meet 
federal regulatory standards for minimizing air pollution from automobile 
emissions.220  The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had 
approved MTBE as one of several oxygenates that refiners could use to 
meet the new standards; ethanol was another.221
The plaintiffs allege that MTBE has reached or will reach their water 
sources because gasoline containing MTBE has leaked or spilled into the 
ground.  They claim that MTBE in the water supply has caused taste and 
odor problems and raised health concerns.
 
222  The alleged damages range in 
amounts, depending on the number and size of the plaintiffs’ water wells 
and the extent of alleged contamination.  Several of the plaintiffs have 
sought tens or hundreds of millions of dollars in compensatory damages.223  
Simple math establishes the astronomical size of the aggregate potential 
liability when the alleged damages are multiplied by the number of 
consolidated cases.  And the plaintiffs also seek to recover punitive 
damages based on allegations that the defendants misled the public about 
MTBE’s properties.224
Both the facts and the law in MTBE cases are complex.
  
225
 
 217. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
  And all of the 
complex legal questions—“virtually every substantive and procedural 
 218. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL 
DOCKETS (As of Jan. 11, 2011) 9, available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/
Pending_MDL_Dockets-January-2011.pdf.  (Note that as the JPML updates its statistics, it 
replaces prior versions of its pending distribution summaries with updated versions.) 
 219. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 219, 104 Stat. 2399, 
2492–2500 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2006)).  The statute was subsequently 
amended again in 2005. See Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1504, 119 
Stat. 594, 1076–80 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 220. California v. Atl. Richfield Co. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. 
Liab. Litig.), 488 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 221. See id. (“Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the [EPA] in 1991, MTBE is one of 
several different oxygenates that may be used to certify gasoline as reformulated.”). 
 222. Id. at 114–15. 
 223. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 47135, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (describing single plaintiff’s $104 
million verdict against single defendant for subset of allegedly contaminated wells); In re 
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 2d 519, 520 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing $422 million cash portion of partial settlement of fifty-nine 
plaintiffs’ claims). 
 224. See, e.g., City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl 
Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 96469 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009) (holding evidence in one particular case 
insufficient to warrant jury consideration of punitive damages). 
 225. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that MTBE cases 
raise “complex issues of state law”). 
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issue” that has come up in the focus cases—have been decided by a single 
district court judge.226  By 2007 that single judge had “issued thirty-six 
substantive opinions and orders, comprising more than one thousand pages 
of text . . . .”227  Many of the court’s interlocutory decisions “resolved 
disputed issues of state law.”228
The absence of immediate appellate review has been particularly 
significant for three of the district court’s decisions.  All three decisions left 
significant room for debate about what the law is (or should be).  And the 
decisions had “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s]” for the 
litigants, the course of the litigation, and the choice between settling and 
proceeding to trial.  I explain each of them in turn. 
 
a.  Three Questionable Rulings in the MTBE MDL Proceedings 
i.  The Holding That Plaintiffs’ State-Law Claims Were Not Barred by 
Conflict Preemption 
Conflict preemption is a defense that applies “where state law ‘stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”229  In the MTBE context, the defense springs 
from the federal requirement to reduce gasoline air emissions through a 
choice of approved oxygenates, including MTBE.  The Supreme Court has 
held that when federal law permits a range of choices, states may not 
regulate or impose tort liability in a way that restricts those federally 
approved choices.230
The defendants have argued that tort liability for using MTBE would 
interfere with the EPA regulations permitting them to use a choice of 
oxygenates, including MTBE.
 
231  The MTBE court has repeatedly rejected 
this argument.232
 
 226. Id. at 330. 
  In doing so, the court ignored Congress’s express 
delegation to the EPA the responsibility of approving oxygenates to meet 
the statutory emission-reduction standards, “taking into consideration the 
cost of achieving such emission reductions, any nonair-quality and other 
air-quality related health and environmental impacts and energy 
 227. Id. at 301. 
 228. Id. at 301 n.8 (citations omitted); see also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 2d 324, 326 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (listing numerous 
opinions). 
 229. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
 230. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (tort liability); Fid. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (regulatory restrictions). 
 231. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
 232. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 92744, at *52–53 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2010) (denying post-trial motion for judgment 
as a matter of law); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 457 
F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying motion for summary judgment); In re Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 614–16 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (denying motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)). 
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requirements.”233  And the court dismissed as speculative the defendants’ 
argument that imposition of tort liability against any of the various 
approved oxygenates (MTBE in this case, ethanol in the next) could leave 
the defendants with no viable options for meeting federal clean-air 
requirements234—even while acknowledging that “[p]ermitting the City’s 
state tort claims to proceed [under these circumstances] may seem 
unfair.”235
Conflict preemption, by its nature, is dispositive of state-law claims.  But 
the district court refused to certify its pretrial preemption decisions for 
immediate review under § 1292(b).  The court noted its “‘unfettered 
discretion to deny certification’”
 
236 and found no “substantial ground for 
difference of opinion.”237  The latter holding is particularly startling—not 
only because of the potential flaws in the court’s reasoning, but also 
because “courts are split” on “the preemption of claims to remedy MTBE 
contamination.”238
ii.  The Creation of a New Causation Theory:  Commingled-Product Market 
Share 
 
Perhaps the most vigorously contested state-law question in the MTBE 
litigation has been causation, which stems from “the problem of product 
identification.”239  In response to the plaintiffs’ difficulties in establishing 
causation, the court “fashion[ed] a new collective liability” theory,240 which 
the court named the “‘commingled product theory’ of market share 
liability.”241
The genesis of the theory is the proposition that plaintiffs would be 
unable to establish liability without a relaxation of traditional causation 
  No state had ever recognized or endorsed this theory; it was 
the court’s own creation, and it has evolved considerably over time even 
within the MTBE litigation.  Despite its novelty, its malleability, and the 
reasonable possibility that states would not extend their laws to recognize it, 
no other court—state or federal, trial or appellate—has had occasion to 
review it.  Yet it remains the law governing the vast majority of the actions 
consolidated in the MTBE MDL. 
 
 233. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1) (2006). 
 234. In re MTBE, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 343. 
 235. In re MTBE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92744, at *52–53. 
 236. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 4, 7 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 71 F. 
Supp. 2d 139, 162 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). 
 237. Id. at 8. 
 238. See Carrie L. Williamson, “But You Said We Could Do It!”:  Oil Companies’ 
Liability for the Unintended Consequence of MTBE Water Contamination, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
315, 326 (2002). 
 239. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 348, 
362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 240. M. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian, Defendant Indeterminacy:  New Wine into Old 
Skins, 67 LA. L. REV. 785, 816 (2007). 
 241. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377. 
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principles.242  The physical properties of MTBE and the nature of the 
gasoline distribution system make it impossible to identify the manufacturer 
of the gasoline that may have reached to a particular contamination site.243  
But the court gleaned from the case law that “from time to time courts have 
fashioned new approaches in order to permit plaintiffs to pursue a recovery 
when the facts and circumstances of their actions raised unforeseen barriers 
to relief.”244
After identifying “the need for one more theory,” and using first-person 
language emphasizing its role in developing new law,
 
245
When a plaintiff can prove that certain gaseous or liquid products (e.g., 
gasoline, liquid propane, alcohol) of many suppliers were present in a 
completely commingled or blended state at the time and place that the risk 
of harm occurred, and the commingled product caused a single indivisible 
injury, then each of the products should be deemed to have caused the 
harm.
 the court held: 
246
To determine each defendant’s several share of liability, the court would 
look to its “share of the market at the time of the injury.”
 
247
The commingled-product theory departs from existing law, in which 
“identification of the exact defendant whose product injured the plaintiff 
is . . . generally required.”
 
248  Judge Jack Weinstein had rejected a similar 
commingled-product theory in an earlier MDL.249  And the MTBE court 
acknowledged that the recognition of the new theory of state tort law was “a 
policy decision” that raised important federalism concerns.250
 
 242. E.g., Cesar Pereira, Comment, Protecting the “Underground Seas”:  A Case for 
Protecting and Creating Claims Against Oil Companies for Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Groundwater Contamination, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2004) (“[P]laintiffs 
suing MTBE manufacturers under a claim of negligence may have a hard time establishing 
causation.”). 
 
 243. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 362. 
 244. Id. at 377 (emphasis added); see also Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re 
Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 447 F. Supp. 2d 289, 301 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). 
 245. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377 (“I shall now describe what I call the 
‘commingled product theory’ of market share liability.”); see also City of New York v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 
Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92744, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
7, 2010) (“[I]n order to protect the interests of plaintiffs in this MDL while fairly 
apportioning liability, I have developed the commingled product theory of liability.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 246. In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 377–78; see also In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 
301 (same); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 591 F. Supp. 2d 249, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same); Madden & 
Holian, supra note 240, at 816–21 (summarizing commingled-product theory). 
 247. In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 301. 
 248. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1073 (N.Y. 1989). 
 249. See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985) (dismissing claims in part because plaintiffs failed to prove “that any particular 
defendant produced the Agent Orange to which he may have been exposed” and noting that 
“[n]o case has ever permitted recovery in such a situation”), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 250. In re MTBE, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 301; In re MTBE, 379 F. Supp. 2d at 369–70; see 
also Johnstown v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 877 F.2d 1146, 1153 (2d Cir. 1989) 
1680 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
The MTBE court has also acknowledged that the new theory has 
engendered “much confusion,”251 that it “has been difficult to describe,”252 
and that the court “has described the commingled theory in different ways 
over the years.”253  The inconsistencies have involved both the reasonable 
inferences that a jury could draw from the plaintiffs’ evidence of a 
commingled gasoline distribution system254 and the predicate showing that 
a plaintiff would have to make in order to resort to the commingled-product 
theory in the first place.255  The court has dismissed the inconsistencies as 
“not important.”256
Given the novelty of the theory and the court’s own difficulty in 
articulating it consistently, one might expect that the court would have 
appreciated and encouraged the participation of other judges before 
imposing the theory on hundreds of parties in an MDL proceeding 
involving the laws of multiple states.
 
257  But that is not what happened.  
Instead, the district court twice rejected the defendants’ request for 
certification under § 1292(b).258  It did so even though the focus cases have 
been New York cases,259
 
(admonishing federal courts “not to adopt innovative theories that may distort established 
state law”); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction:  Allocating Cases 
Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1239 (2004) (noting “general 
preference for resolving novel state law questions in state court”). 
 and certification under § 1292(b) would have 
 251. In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 267. 
 252. City of New York v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 644 F. Supp. 2d 310, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 253. Id. at 318. 
 254. Compare In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (“[N]o reasonable jury could find, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that each defendant’s gasoline caused the contamination of 
each well.”), with id. at 275 (“A reasonable jury could conclude that each defendant’s 
gasoline was present within the well’s capture zone even if the jury concludes that it cannot 
identify the source of the spill that caused the well’s contamination.”). 
 255. Compare Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 447 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304–05 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“If there is an 
identifiable defendant (or defendants) and plaintiffs can obtain a make-whole remedy from 
those parties, then there is no need to turn to an alternative theory of liability to pursue other 
possible tortfeasors.”), with In re MTBE, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 276 (“I have previously stated 
that alternative liability theories . . . should not be applied unless plaintiffs have no other 
remedy. . . . I now conclude that plaintiffs may pursue product liability or negligence claims 
against manufacturers . . . regardless of whether plaintiffs can identify a retailer whose 
leaking tank spilled gasoline into a well’s capture zone.”). 
 256. See In re MTBE, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 318. 
 257. See Waters, supra note 9, at 553 (“If dramatic innovations in procedural and 
substantive law are to take place as a result of the mass tort regime, mass tort trial judges, 
specialists though they may be, must be able to look to the appellate courts for guidance as to 
the appropriate limits of such innovation.”). 
 258. See Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358, M 21-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47222, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 259. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 34471, at *4 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010); Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess 
Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 
301 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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enabled the Second Circuit to certify the novel state-law issue to New 
York’s highest court.260  Remarkably, the court concluded that there was no 
“substantial ground for difference of opinion.”261
iii.  The Retention of Jurisdiction After the Supreme Court Rejected 
Federal-Officer Removal 
 
The MTBE court’s debatable rulings on issues of substantive law warrant 
even greater scrutiny in light of the court’s questionable jurisdiction over 
some of the cases consolidated within the MDL proceedings. 
The jurisdictional defect stemmed from developments in the law under 
the federal-officer removal statute.262  The defendants in the MTBE cases 
removed several actions to federal court, alleging that they had added 
MTBE to gasoline “at the direction of the EPA” and that the federal court 
had jurisdiction over any related civil claims.263  The court denied the 
plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding that the defendants’ removal 
allegations were sufficient to establish federal-officer jurisdiction.264  It 
then denied the plaintiffs’ request for interlocutory-appeal certification 
under § 1292(b), finding, among other things, “no substantial ground for a 
difference of opinion with respect to the Court’s jurisdictional analysis.”265
Later developments confirmed that there was substantial ground.  In 
2007, the Second Circuit held that federal-officer removal was not 
appropriate in the MTBE cases.
 
266  That holding ostensibly required the 
district court to remand the cases removed on the basis of federal-officer 
jurisdiction.267
 
 260. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(a) (2008) (New York Court of 
Appeals accepts certified questions only from “the Supreme Court of the United States, any 
United States Court of Appeals, or a court of last resort of any other state”); see also Cnty. of 
Westchester v. Comm’r of Transp., 9 F.3d 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1993) (suggesting that a district 
court confronted with a novel issue of state law should certify an appeal under § 1292(b) so 
that the state-law issue can “in turn be certified” to the Connecticut Supreme Court). 
  But the district court refused to remand.  It retained 
jurisdiction on the strength of a federal claim, under the citizen-suit 
 261. See In re MTBE, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47222, at *10–15. 
 262. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006) (providing for removal to federal court of any case 
against “[t]he United States or any agency thereof or any officer (or any person acting under 
that officer) of the United States or of any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual 
capacity for any act under color of such office . . . .”). 
 263. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 342 F. Supp. 2d 147, 
156 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 264. Id. at 159. 
 265. Orange Cnty. Water Dist. v. Unocal Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 225, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005). 
 266. California v. Atl. Richfield Co. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. 
Liab. Litig.), 488 F.3d 112, 124–32 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 
551 U.S. 142, 153 (2007) (“[A] highly regulated firm cannot find a statutory basis for 
removal in the fact of federal regulation alone.”). 
 267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that 
the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). 
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provision of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA),268 that the 
plaintiffs had added by way of amendment after removal.269
Pinning jurisdiction on that post-removal event ran counter to established 
law holding that subject-matter jurisdiction “‘depends upon the state of 
things at the time of the action brought.’”
 
270  The district court nevertheless 
concluded that it could exercise jurisdiction because it “believed that [it] 
had jurisdiction” when it permitted the plaintiffs to add the TSCA claim271 
and because the TSCA amendment was “intended to solidify the court’s 
jurisdiction” rather than destroy jurisdiction.272  Neither justification for 
refusing to remand was supported by the case law; the Supreme Court had 
recently reemphasized a bright-line “time-of-filing rule” whether 
“destruction or perfection of jurisdiction is at issue.”273
Ultimately, the court’s refusal to remand seemed most influenced by its 
concerns with “finality, efficiency and economy”
 
274 and its distaste for a 
result that “would ignore the years of effort by the Court and the parties.”275  
But this exception ignored the Supreme Court’s express rejection of “an 
approach to jurisdiction that focuses on efficiency and judicial economy”276 
and its reaffirmation of “the time-of-filing rule regardless of the costs it 
imposes.”277
Given the district court’s unsupported bases for retaining jurisdiction in a 
case that it acknowledged was “sui generis,”
 
278 one might have expected 
(or hoped) that the Second Circuit would entertain a request for mandamus 
relief.279  But the Second Circuit refused the defendant’s request for 
mandamus, finding no “exceptional circumstances.”280  As a result, the 
improperly removed cases remained (and those that did not settle281 still 
remain) in the same district court that has rendered debatable substantive 
decisions on both federal and state law.  Ironically, had the case returned to 
New York state court, the substantive rulings may themselves have been 
subject to interlocutory appeal282
 
 268. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2006). 
—and we would know with certainty, for 
 269. See Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 270. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting 
Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 537, 539 (1824)). 
 271. See In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 306 n.31 (emphasis added). 
 272. Id. at 307 (citing Chabner v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.3 
(9th Cir. 2000)). 
 273. Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 580–81. 
 274. In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 307. 
 275. Id. at 319. 
 276. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U.S. at 577. 
 277. Id. at 571. 
 278. In re MTBE, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 305–06. 
 279. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 9, at 591–93 (advocating expansion of resort to writs of 
mandamus). 
 280. Order, In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 07-4290, 
07-4308, at 2 (2d Cir. Nov. 16, 2007). 
 281. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text. 
 282. See ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRACTICE:  FEDERAL AND STATE 
CIVIL APPEALS § 4.12 (1983) (“New York places virtually no restrictions on the right to 
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example, whether the New York cases are to be governed by the federal 
district court’s newly fashioned commingled-product theory. 
b.  The Impact of Insulating the MTBE Rulings from Interlocutory Review 
The denial of interlocutory appellate review in the MTBE cases has 
insulated the trial court from any meaningful scrutiny of decisions that have 
the potential to redistribute billions of dollars.  The right to appeal would 
potentially have tempered the court’s inclination to depart from or to extend 
existing law.  But the unsuccessful attempts to appeal seem to have had the 
opposite effect.  In denying a request for § 1292(b) certification from one of 
its decisions relating to its commingled-product theory, the court chastised 
the defendants for “seeking interlocutory appeal . . . three times in less than 
one year.”283
Measuring the precise economic impact of the district court’s unbridled 
power is difficult, because we do not know what would have occurred if the 
appellate court had been willing to review even one of these rulings.  We 
know, though, that shortly after the failed attempts to appeal, all of the 
defendants ultimately settled for hundreds of millions of dollars with one 
group of plaintiffs, including the plaintiffs in one of the early New York 
focus cases.
 
284  Another group of plaintiffs also settled with most of the 
defendants, leaving only one defendant willing to go to trial.285  It stands to 
reason that the cost of these settlements was higher as a result of the district 
court’s rulings and the inability to obtain immediate appellate review.  
Indeed, appellate review might have established that the defendants had no 
liability at all.  But the option of going to trial and seeking to correct the 
legal error after final judgment was obviously even more unpalatable.286  In 
the lone case that so far has proceeded to trial against the only non-settling 
defendant, a single plaintiff pursued only a portion of its alleged 
damages287 and won a compensatory verdict of over a hundred million 
dollars.288
 
appeal.”); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5701(a) & (a)(2)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 2010) (listing broad 
categories of appeals available “as of right” in New York state courts, including orders that 
“involve[] some part of the merits”). 
  Most defendants would be unwilling or unable to withstand that 
 283. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Amerada Hess Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) 
Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
47222, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2008). 
 284. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 578 F. Supp. 2d 
519, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 285. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 Civ. 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 47135, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2010) (noting that trial proceeded against Exxon 
Mobil entities, as they were “the only remaining defendants in this case”). 
 286. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text. 
 287. See City of New York v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether 
(MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 00 MDL 1898 (SAS), 04 Civ. 3417 (SAS), 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 34471, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010) (“In preparation for trial, five focus wells, 
among the dozens at issue in this case, were selected.”). 
 288. See In re MTBE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47135, at *3. 
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kind of verdict.  Yet it has become the purchase price for the right of 
appeal. 
Is the MTBE example sufficiently representative?  To answer that 
question would require a detailed analysis of the important legal rulings 
rendered in a statistically significant number of MDL cases, and I have not 
undertaken that examination.  Certainly, however, there is other anecdotal 
evidence, both in the recent case law289 and in commentary,290
For those who view any settlement as the highest and best objective, then 
perhaps the MTBE cases show that the existing system is satisfactory.  But 
if we want parties to settle only if the settlement reflects the true value of 
the claims; if we want tort liability to serve its utilitarian purpose in 
adjusting parties’ behaviors in the marketplace;
 to suggest 
that the appellate courthouse doors are frequently closed in the face of MDL 
litigants trying mightily to break them down.  And, at bottom, the more 
infrequently an MDL gives rise to the need for immediate appeal, the 
smaller the burden an expanded pathway to appeal would impose on the 
courts.  In other words, a new avenue for mandatory appeal is justified 
regardless of how frequently a litigant may legitimately invoke it. 
291 and if we want to ensure 
that any evolution of our common law takes place with the benefit of 
consideration by multiple judges (and not just one),292 then the existing 
MDL system is inadequate.  As Professor Waters writes, “the appellate 
courts will have very little influence” over the evolution of substantive law 
in mass-tort cases “unless they change their approach to interlocutory 
appellate review.”293
 
 289. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 226 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting petition for writ of 
mandamus in case involving federal court’s refusal to remand cases to state court); In re Diet 
Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 145 
(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing appeal from interim attorney-fee award); Adelphia Recovery 
Trust v. Bank of Am., N.A., Nos. 05 Civ. 9050, 03 MDL 1529, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50209, at *72–76 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2010) (denying § 1292(b) certification over order 
dismissing claims for lack of standing); In re Bisphenol-A (BPA) Polycarbonate Plastic 
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1967, No. 08-1967-MD-W-ODS, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3904, at *30–32 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2010) (denying § 1292(b) certification over order 
specifying which categories of defendants had alleged cognizable damages related to use of 
plastic baby bottles); Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), No. 02 MDL 
1499 (SAS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121559, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2009) (denying 
§ 1292(b) certification over holding that Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), applies 
to corporations); Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. 
Litig.), 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 464 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying § 1292(b) certification over 
order dismissing claims based on plaintiff’s attempted use of aggregate proof); In re Guidant 
Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 05-1708 (DWF/AJB), 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56557, at *4–5 (D. Minn. July 1, 2009) (summarizing third-party 
plaintiffs’ several unsuccessful attempts at interlocutory appeal over order dismissing claims 
for lack of standing). 
 
 290. See supra note 182 (commentators discussing Judge Weinstein’s refusal to permit 
interlocutory review of orders rendered in Agent Orange MDL). 
 291. See, e.g., supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra notes 183–91 and accompanying text. 
 293. Waters, supra note 9, at 566; see also id. at 530 (“[M]ass tort trial judges are 
creating, systematizing, and refining the [mass-tort] genre alone, without the guidance of 
appellate courts.”); id. at 531 (“[A]ppellate courts lack the necessary tools to exercise their 
proper role in supervising the development of the mass tort regime.”). 
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III.  THE SOLUTION:  A LIMITED RIGHT OF APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY 
LEGAL RULINGS IN MDL CASES 
To solve the problem, I propose a new category of mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction over certain interlocutory orders entered in MDL proceedings.  
Identifying the criteria is admittedly challenging, because they must be 
articulated “broadly enough to capture the entire problem area, yet narrowly 
enough not to impose an unmanageable additional burden on circuit 
courts.”294  But I believe these three criteria, similar in large measure to the 
criteria of § 1292(b), strike the right balance:  (1) the order must raise an 
issue of law; (2) there must be no controlling law on point, or the district 
court must have elected not to follow it; and (3) appellate review must be 
potentially dispositive of a significant number of the cases consolidated in 
the MDL proceeding.  I elaborate below on each of the three criteria.295
A.  Section 1292(b) Criteria Invigorated:  Appeals of Right in MDL 
Proceedings 
 
1.  An Issue of Pure Law 
The first criterion under my proposal is the simplest and most familiar:  
the interlocutory order in question must raise a question of pure law.  This 
criterion echoes the first criterion of § 1292(b) and one of the more salient 
functions of Rule 23(f)—to permit appellate review of “important legal 
issues that otherwise might prove elusive.”296  These arise most commonly 
from rulings on motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and involve 
“a question of the meaning of a statutory or constitutional provision, 
regulation, or common law doctrine.”297
There are several reasons for requiring that the issue involve a legal 
question.  First, that limitation eliminates large categories of orders on 
nonlegal questions that typically involve trial-court discretion, such as those 
affecting docket management, discovery disputes, or trial procedure.  While 
legal rulings are reviewed de novo, discretionary rulings are reviewed under 
the more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and are therefore less 
likely to be reversed.
 
298
 
 294. Glynn, supra note 
  Limiting interlocutory appeal to issues of law 
17, at 261. 
 295. There are certainly other possible vehicles for expanding the review currently 
available from interlocutory trial court orders in MDL cases.  One alternative approach, for 
example, would be to bolster the MDL system with MDL appellate panels comprised of 
other district court judges, similar to the bankruptcy appellate panels that Congress has 
authorized. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006).  But the proposal I offer has the advantage of 
operating within an existing judicial structure and avoiding the administrative burdens that 
accompany new institutions. 
 296. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1016 (7th 
Cir. 2002). 
 297. Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 219 F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 298. See Paul R. Michel, Foreword:  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Must 
Evolve To Meet the Challenges Ahead, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1192 (1999) (“In general, 
the chances of reversal are much higher on an issue subject to de novo review than under any 
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helps ensure that the court of appeals is called upon to examine only those 
orders that require its exacting review. 
That is not to say that some orders that are ultimately exercises of trial-
court discretion would categorically fail to qualify for immediate review.  If 
the trial court resolves a legal question in the course of ruling on a 
discretionary matter, then the order in question may potentially fit the bill.  
For example, a trial court may be required to articulate the governing law to 
resolve a discovery dispute, and an appellate court would review de novo 
the legal analysis underlying that decision.299  In general, however, the 
issue-of-law requirement would protect against an onslaught of 
questionable appeals from the numerous instances in which trial courts are 
called upon to exercise their discretion.300
Limiting interlocutory review to legal issues also ensures that 
interlocutory appeals will have the most direct impact on the parties’ 
assessments of potential litigation outcomes.  Such review would assist the 
parties in evaluating and accurately pricing settlement, thus stabilizing the 
economic impact of the mass tort and better reflecting the costs that a 
tortfeasor should bear for having caused the alleged injuries.  By contrast, 
most nonlegal rulings are unlikely to influence the parties’ assessments of 
their overall risks. 
 
Beyond the parties, requiring appellate courts to participate more actively 
in articulating the governing law would temper the outsized influence that 
MDL judges have over the evolution of legal theories.  In the current 
system, the pressure to settle before trial all but ensures that a case never 
reaches final judgment—and, thus, rarely reaches the court of appeals.  A 
single MDL judge’s articulation of the law in essence becomes the law, 
with no review or input from other judges.  But an immediate appeal before 
settlement would decentralize that power and ensure that difficult legal 
questions enjoy a full measure of judicial consideration. 
It also bears mention that my proposal would supplement the existing 
avenues of immediate discretionary jurisdiction, so litigants would lose no 
existing rights of appeal from trial-court decisions that do not raise issues of 
pure law.  For example, the discretionary decision whether to certify a 
class301
 
of the other deferential standards of review . . . .”); see also Dalton, supra note 
—even in an MDL proceeding—would still qualify for 
19, at 80 
(“[R]eversals are more likely when the question is one of law . . . .”). 
 299. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009) (recognizing 
propriety of certifying discovery-privilege order for immediate appeal under § 1292(b) when 
it “involves a new legal question”). 
 300. Perhaps with the benefit of experience under my current proposal, there would be a 
case for expanding the availability of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in MDL cases to 
include appeals from certain discretionary rulings.  There certainly is extensive criticism in 
the literature of the extent to which trial judges enjoy discretion in case management, even 
outside the MDL context. See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 126, at 720–26 (discussing academic 
critiques of trial-court discretion). 
 301. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 630 (1997) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (district courts have “‘broad power and 
discretion . . . with respect to matters involving the certification’ of class actions” (quoting 
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979))). 
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discretionary appellate review under Rule 23(f).  Mandamus would also 
remain an option for other orders on matters committed to the district 
court’s discretion, such as discovery orders involving privileged 
material.302
Limiting review to legal issues would insulate both the trial and appellate 
courts from excessive appeals, while still providing a right of appellate 
review on the questions that make the most difference for the parties and, 
ultimately, the evolution of the law.  And because there is no room for 
serious disagreement about whether an issue is or is not a legal issue, this 
element of my proposed test serves as a rule, rather than a standard, and will 
presumably enjoy consistent application from court to court and from case 
to case. 
 
2.  An Unsettled Area of Law or an Order That Disregards Settled Law 
The second criterion of my proposal is that the issue of law be novel or 
unsettled, or that the district court has declined to follow settled law.  This 
requirement, similar to the § 1292(b) requirement that there be “substantial 
ground for difference of opinion”303 (and perhaps even more similar to its 
analog in bankruptcy304), ensures that the interlocutory appeal actually 
merits an appellate court’s immediate attention.  But unlike the second 
prong under § 1292(b), a mere basis for disagreement is not enough to 
trigger appellate jurisdiction; this second criterion would instead require a 
would-be appellant to demonstrate that the district court has unilaterally 
undertaken to define the law in a new area or has disregarded controlling 
precedent.  The three decisions in the MTBE litigation described above305 
would all fit the bill.  This avenue for immediate appeal would be 
particularly helpful for federal court pronouncements of state law, where 
the comity considerations demand even greater scrutiny306 and where 
immediate appellate review would, in some cases, facilitate certification to 
the state’s highest court.307
Admittedly, this criterion overlaps to some extent with the merits of the 
appeal.  But that is not a novel problem in appellate jurisdiction.  The 
analogous provision of § 1292(b) shares that quality, and the likelihood of 
 
 
 302. See Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 607 (“[I]n extraordinary circumstances—i.e., when a 
disclosure order . . . works a manifest injustice—a party may petition the court of appeals for 
a writ of mandamus.”); see also Robertson, supra note 22, at 779–85 (advocating mandamus 
when trial court refuses to certify interlocutory appeal from order compelling disclosure of 
privileged material). 
 303. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 304. See id. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (“[Q]uestion of law as to which there is no controlling 
decision of the court of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
or involves a matter of public importance . . . .”). 
 305. See supra Part II.B.3.a. 
 306. See supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 260 and accompanying text. 
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error has also been suggested as an appropriate factor in determining 
whether to hear discretionary appeals under Rule 23(f).308
Of course, reasonable jurists can disagree about the extent to which a 
district court’s articulation of the law has truly departed from established 
precedent.  In that respect, this element of my proposed test has the 
potential to dissolve into a discretionary standard,
 
309 as opposed to a 
mandatory rule.  Such disagreements are not ideal, but they are also 
inevitable in any test for mandatory appellate jurisdiction.310  They are no 
more troubling at the jurisdictional stage than they would be on the merits 
in an appeal after a final judgment.  Our legal system often grapples with 
legal tests that combine fixed rules with flexible standards,311
3.  An Issue That Is Potentially Dispositive of a Significant Number of 
Cases in the MDL 
 and the 
imperfection of that blend is less troubling than the absence of appellate 
review altogether.  And, at bottom, an appellate court that rejects 
jurisdiction based on this criterion would implicitly suggest agreement with 
the district court’s decision, which alone would provide some measure of 
guidance to the litigants. 
The third criterion of my proposal is that an immediate appeal have a 
potentially dispositive impact on a significant number of the cases 
consolidated within the MDL—analogous to the § 1292(b) requirement that 
an interlocutory appeal “may materially advance the ultimate termination of 
the litigation.”312
 
 308. See Christopher A. Kitchen, Note, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action Certification 
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f):  A Proposal for a New Guideline, 
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 233 (“[T]he courts of appeals should each adopt a 
guideline” for discretionary review of class-certification orders under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(f) “that allows for appeal when it can be shown that the district court’s 
decision is ‘likely erroneous.’”). 
  This requirement ensures that the leap from discretionary 
to mandatory jurisdiction is justified under the circumstances.  Thus, if the 
MDL setting is the factor that creates the “serious, perhaps irreparable, 
consequence” of deferring appellate review until final judgment, then there 
 309. See Redish, supra note 25, at 101 (suggesting, for discretionary appeals, “a kind of 
‘probable cause’ examination of the issue, comparable in some ways to a shorthand certiorari 
process, by which the appellate court could satisfy itself without full study of the merits that 
the issue on appeal posed a legal question whose answer was either uncertain or likely to 
have been incorrectly determined by the district court”). 
 310. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties in defining 
contours of final-judgment rule). 
 311. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 13, at 561 (“[L]egal commands mix [rules and 
standards] in varying degrees.”). 
 312. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).  The Supreme Court recently held that “district courts 
should not hesitate to certify” a discovery-privilege ruling for interlocutory appeal if it 
“involves a new legal question or is of special consequence.” Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. 
Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 607 (2009).  Since discovery rulings will rarely advance the 
termination of the litigation, we are left to conclude that the Court does not necessarily 
require a would-be appellant to meet that prong of the test.  My proposed reform, by 
contrast, absolutely requires that the order in question have the potential to be dispositive of 
a substantial number of cases consolidated within an MDL. 
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must be a corresponding requirement that the interlocutory appeal will itself 
have MDL-sized impact.313
Implementing this criterion presents no special challenges, but it is 
admittedly the prong of my test that retains the sort of case-by-case 
subjectivity normally seen in discretionary review and more akin to a 
standard than a rule.  To some extent the case-by-case evaluation is 
unavoidable; a requirement in terms of absolute numbers of affected cases 
or even the affected percentage of consolidated cases seems too rigid.  At 
the same time, there must be a check against the appellate courts’ 
institutional inclination to decline review too frequently.  The presumption, 
then, should be in favor of interlocutory review.  A court should decline 
review only when the order in question clearly appears to have a limited 
impact on a very small number of the consolidated cases. 
  It makes no sense to depart from the strictures 
of the final-judgment rule unless the departure actually addresses the 
problem we are trying to solve. 
As an illustration, this prong of the test would not have deprived the 
appellate court of jurisdiction over the district court’s conflict-preemption 
decision in the MTBE litigation, because that issue has affected every case 
in the MDL.  It also would have required appellate review of the district 
court’s creation of the commingled-product theory, because that theory has 
affected every case governed by the law of the states that the court held 
would adopt it.  The district court’s questionable jurisdiction over the cases 
originally removed to federal court solely on the basis of § 1442(a)(1) is a 
closer call, because the issue has affected a smaller subset of the MDL 
cases, and reversal would have returned them to state court rather than 
aiding in their substantive resolution.314
B.  The Benefits of Mandatory Appeal from Important Interlocutory MDL 
Orders Outweigh the Costs 
  But even a denial of interlocutory 
review over the jurisdictional question would have been a tolerable result, 
because the affected cases would still have benefited from the immediate 
appeals that would have gone forward on the other two issues. 
Like all policy choices, creating a new category of mandatory appellate 
jurisdiction—and the specific proposal I offer here for doing so—comes 
with costs.  Policymakers and commentators have debated the trade-offs 
between the final-judgment rule and its exceptions for over a century.  But 
the disadvantages always inherent in expanding appellate jurisdiction are 
worth the price in the MDL context.  At bottom, the reform I propose would 
foster the integrity of the MDL system, which is designed, after all, to 
promote judicial efficiency. 
 
 313. Cf. Solimine & Hines, supra note 196, at 1582 (noting, in Rule 23(f) context, that 
“the presence or absence of simultaneous litigation in other courts” would weigh in favor of 
interlocutory review). 
 314. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. 1:00-1898, MDL 
1358 (SAS), M 21-88, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2005). 
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Expanding mandatory appellate jurisdiction is not an insignificant 
reform, but it is certainly not without precedent in our relatively recent 
history.  The Supreme Court, though it struggles to limit the collateral-order 
doctrine, created the category in 1949315 and has frequently expanded its 
reach.316  And Congress, to protect arbitration clauses, added a new 
category of mandatory appellate jurisdiction in 1988 from orders refusing to 
enforce them.317
There are obviously several costs to my proposal, beginning with the 
increased appellate workload that will naturally result.
 
318  The added 
resources required to staff the appellate courts adequately will require 
capital outlay.  But Congress, in enacting the MDL statute, has already 
established a policy that the benefits of coordinated MDL proceedings 
justify the costs of staffing the JPML and administering the MDL system; it 
is unlikely that the added appellate costs would skew that analysis.  And 
there will be an offset in the workload of the district courts, in some 
instances by resolving cases entirely and in others by preventing district 
courts from wasting their resources on activities premised on a 
misconception of the law.319
Several commentators have also pointed out that a new category of 
appellate jurisdiction would create “satellite procedural litigation” over 
appellate jurisdiction in each case.
 
320  While litigation over appellate 
jurisdiction is not ideal, it is nothing new.  For example, in the collateral-
order context, courts must grapple with such amorphous factors as whether 
the “interlocutory ruling” in question “concerns an ‘important’ issue.”321
 
 315. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
  
Most avenues of discretionary jurisdiction requires briefing on the threshold 
 316. See, e.g., Lloyd C. Anderson, The Collateral Order Doctrine:  A New “Serbonian 
Bog” and Four Proposals for Reform, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 539, 575–76 (1998) (“[T]he 
Court’s periodic willingness to expand the [collateral-order] doctrine . . . created a long list 
of new candidates for collateral order appeal.”). 
 317. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Bergeron, supra note 33, at 1366. 
 318. See Waters, supra note 9, at 586 (frequent appellate review in mass-tort cases “is 
simply not practicable in light of the much-lamented (and much-debated) caseload crisis 
already facing the courts of appeals”). 
 319. See Solimine, supra note 33, at 1178 (“A modest increase in interlocutory appeals, 
however, may decrease the overall federal court caseload by expediting and possibly 
shortening the resolution of trial court cases and by leading to more settlements at the district 
court level.”). 
 320. See Glynn, supra note 17, at 254 (“[T]he category-based approach has the potential 
to produce some collateral litigation over the issue of appealability, specifically, whether the 
order in question falls within the category covered by the rule.”); Nagel, supra note 42, at 
220 (“Broad categories in mandatory terms would likely lead to substantial amounts of 
satellite procedural litigation construing the boundaries of these categories.”); Rosenberg, 
supra note 29, at 172 (“Entirely too much of the appellate courts’ energy is absorbed in 
deciding whether they are entitled under the finality principle and its exceptions to hear cases 
brought before them—and explaining why or why not.”).  One commentator dismisses this 
concern. See Redish, supra note 25, at 101 (“Since appealability of a district court’s order 
can be determined on a motion to dismiss the appeal—at a comparatively early stage in the 
appellate process and presumably before a full-blown analysis of the merits need be 
conducted by either the litigants or the court—such a preliminary determination could be 
made with relative flexibility.”). 
 321. Steinman, supra note 15, at 1253. 
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question whether the appellate courts should accept the case322—and, in the 
cases of § 1292(b) and Rule 54(b), whether the trial court should permit 
it.323  Often these petitions for appellate review hinge on amorphous criteria 
that vary from court to court.324
Another concern is that “any increase in the scope or amount of appellate 
review necessarily results in the reduction of the power and authority of the 
district judge.”
  By contrast, the proposed criteria for 
interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in MDL cases are fairly straightforward. 
325  This dynamic is especially keen when an appeal is 
successful, leaving “the reversed trial judge [to] feel that her time and 
energy have been wasted, her work unappreciated, and her judgment called 
into question.”326  But this concern merits minimal attention, at least in the 
context of my proposed reform.  By definition, only those orders reflecting 
a district judge’s unilateral conception of what the law is (or should be) will 
satisfy the second criterion.  We should hope that our district court judges 
would appreciate and encourage an opportunity to ensure that these 
decisions are correct—especially given the sweeping impact that legal 
rulings can have in MDL cases.  An MDL judge can even control the timing 
by issuing legal decisions at convenient moments in the litigation when an 
interlocutory appeal would be least disruptive.  Any judge who would take 
offense at appellate review in these circumstances needs a check on his own 
hubris.327
Some commentators have also warned that opportunities to appeal 
disproportionately benefit the mass-tort defendants, who tend to have 
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greater financial resources and will use that wherewithal to manipulate the 
litigation process328 and “‘wear out’ a plaintiff with inferior economic 
backing.”329  That concern is mitigated by the growing strength and 
resources of the plaintiffs’ bar.330  And, while any expansion of appellate 
jurisdiction runs the risk of facilitating gamesmanship and inviting delay, 
there are ways to prevent that problem; blocking access to the appellate 
courts is not the best of them.  If the appellant files a frivolous appeal, the 
appellee already has a remedy in the form of “just damages and single or 
double costs,”331 including attorneys’ fees.332
Finally, there is a valid procedural concern:  if a party has a right to an 
interlocutory appeal under this MDL proposal but fails to exercise it, does 
the right revive when the case reaches final judgment?  The Supreme Court 
has recently suggested that it does not revive in the collateral-order 
context.
  Additional sanction 
provisions could also be added, to level the playing field, if experience 
suggests a need to curb abuse.  A specific sanction (such as a higher level of 
prejudgment interest) could be authorized for frivolous appeals that serve 
no purpose other than to engender delay or to exploit a poorer litigant’s lack 
of resources. 
333  While collateral orders are final orders that arguably must be 
appealed immediately, the MDL orders that would become appealable 
under my proposal are, by definition, interlocutory.  Once those 
interlocutory orders merge into a final judgment, the right to appeal should 
merge with them if it has not already been exercised.334
In sum, there are clearly costs to my proposal, as there are with any 
expansion of appellate jurisdiction.  But these costs are worth the price of 
admission considering the numerous benefits for the parties, for the tort 
system, for the evolution of the law, and ultimately for the public’s 
confidence in our multi-tiered justice system. 
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C.  The Best Way To Implement the New Jurisdictional Provision 
Until recently, expanding appellate jurisdiction required an act of 
Congress.335  But in the 1990s, Congress vested the Supreme Court with 
authority to promulgate rules identifying new categories of both final 
judgments336 and appealable interlocutory orders.337
The Court itself has touted the “important virtues” of the rulemaking 
process:  “It draws on the collective experience of bench and bar, and it 
facilitates the adoption of measured, practical solutions.”
  It is now within the 
province of both Congress, through legislation, and the Supreme Court, 
through rulemaking, to expand appellate jurisdiction. 
338  The Court has 
also recognized Congress’s role to “weigh the competing interests of the 
dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of 
savings in time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on 
litigants.”339
The precise vehicle for implementing my proposal is ultimately 
immaterial to the substance; the provisions would operate the same way, 
whether codified in a statute or promulgated as a rule.  I would nevertheless 
suggest that the better approach is to amend the MDL statute, § 1407, to 
add within it the right of appellate review from orders that meet the three 
criteria I have articulated.  That location will undoubtedly offend the 
commentators who lament the disorganization of our patchwork of 
appellate rules.
 
340
 
  But it will highlight an important undercurrent:  the 
MDL system cries out for a new route of appeal, and it belongs, part and 
parcel, with the other MDL statutory provisions.  By amending the statute, 
we ensure, perhaps poetically, that the law governing MDL procedure 
would be consolidated in one place. 
CONCLUSION 
Our tolerance for the final-judgment rule is limited by our desire to 
ameliorate the “substantial, perhaps irreparable, consequence” that it 
sometimes creates.  Congress and the Supreme Court have extended 
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over several categories of interlocutory 
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orders.  The time has come to make another categorical value judgment, 
adding certain MDL orders to that list. 
The MDL system has become so integral to federal civil litigation that it 
seems hard to imagine a time that we lived without it.  Consolidating cases 
with common factual and legal questions provides a tremendous savings to 
our courts and to the parties.  It also facilitates global settlement. 
But the bewitching virtues of the MDL system should not blind us to the 
ways in which it undermines some of the basic principles of American 
jurisprudence—that everyone deserves a day in court, that federal courts 
respect the limits of the state laws they interpret, and that no one judge 
should hold outsized power.  Eventually, the virtues of efficiency reach 
their limit.  Our quest for efficiency runs up against our disdain for 
centralized power. 
We can solve the problem.  Through mandatory appellate jurisdiction, we 
can permit appellate courts to review interlocutory MDL orders, and 
momentarily decentralize MDL proceedings, when MDL judges make legal 
rulings that potentially overstep the law.  Doing so restores balance to the 
proceedings, enables the parties to make informed choices about settlement 
and business practices, and results in a more fully developed body of 
emerging law.  We need mandatory jurisdiction, rather than discretionary 
jurisdiction, because the orders in question—like the other routes to 
mandatory appellate review—fall into a definable category, and because 
experience teaches that courts are parsimonious in permitting discretionary 
review.  In the end, the importance of legal rulings in MDL cases demands 
that appellate review be a component of the system; it should not depend on 
the acquiescence of the MDL judge or the whims of a random three-judge 
panel. 
To be sure, it is costly to interrupt an MDL proceeding while a case 
proceeds to appeal.  But on balance, the costs are more palatable than the 
existing infirmities of an MDL system in which appellate review is largely 
unavailable.  A right of interlocutory appeal would ensure the integrity of 
the MDL system.  And we need to protect that integrity, because the mass 
tort shows no signs of an imminent demise. 
 
